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Abstract 
A long standing question in cognitive science has been: is visual processing completely 
encapsulated and separate from semantics or can visual processing be influenced by semantics? 
We address this question in two ways: 1) Do pictures and words share similar representations and 
2) Does semantics modulate visual processing.  Using multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) and 
fMRI decoding we examined the similarity of neural activity across pictures and words that 
describe natural scenes. A whole brain MVPA searchlight revealed multiple brain regions in the 
occipitotemporal, posterior parietal and frontal cortices that showed transfer from pictures to words 
and from words to pictures. In addition to sharing similar representations across pictures and 
words, can words dynamically influence the processing of visual stimuli? Using Event Related 
Potentials (ERPs) and good and bad exemplars of natural scenes, we show that top-down 
expectation, initiated via a category cue (e.g. the word ‘Beach’), dynamically influences the 
processing of natural scenes. Good and bad exemplars first evoked differential ERPs in the time-
window 250-350 ms from stimulus onset, with the bad exemplars showing greater negativity over 
frontal electrode sites, when the cue matched the image. Interestingly, this good/bad effect 
disappeared when the images were mismatched to the cue. Overall, these studies taken together, 
provide evidence for the influence of semantics on the visual processing of natural scenes. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
	
When you view a picture of a beach, you evoke some concept of a beach in your mind. You also 
evoke a concept of a beach when you read the phrase "Beautiful Beach". These concepts evoked 
by viewing pictures or reading words, share some similarities, even though they are elicited by 
completely different inputs —one is a pictorial input and the other a verbal input. Moreover, 
these input modalities not only evoke similar concepts, but can also dynamically influence each 
other. If I gave you the verbal cue of “umbrella” prior to showing you a picture of an umbrella, 
you would expect to see an umbrella held open vertically (as it is typically used).  It is unlikely 
you would expect to be shown an umbrella held open horizontally or to see someone standing 
under an umbrella while deep inside a swimming pool.  You also might expect to see an 
umbrella that is black in color, and not aquamarine. You have thus used the semantics of an 
umbrella, accessed via the verbal cue, to set up expectations of what you are likely to see -- for 
example it's shape, size, color, orientation and probable location. Do these expectations, set up 
via semantics, influence visual perception? If they do influence visual perception, how do they 
do so? These are the central questions of this dissertation. 
 
The question of whether, when, and how semantics affects vision is a long-standing one. One 
definition of the semantics of an item, is all knowledge that constitutes our concept of that item 
(Cree & McRae, 2003; McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, & Mcnorgan, 2005). It encompasses 
information about the item across multiple modalities (visual, auditory, touch, taste and smell) 
and can include abstract information about the item e.g. “beautiful” or even encyclopedic 
information (“zebras are found in Africa”). It is well established that visual processing can lead 
to semantic processing; for example, after viewing a picture of a beach, we evoke a concept of a 
beach in our minds. What is under debate is whether semantics or prior knowledge can feedback 
and modulate visual processing and perception (Pylyshyn, 1999; Firestone and Scholl, 2014). In 
this thesis, I am going to address this question in two ways. First, I will use functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) along with multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) (Norman, Polyn, 
Detre, & Haxby, 2006) techniques to examine whether there are similar patterns of brain 
activation for semantic category information that is accessed through pictures and through verbal 
stimuli. If we do find evidence for a similar representation across pictures and verbal stimuli in 
	 2	
local brain regions, and we already have some evidence (discussed below in Section 1.1) albeit 
not at a fine local scale, this would imply that the neural code is evoked similarly, in localized 
regions, for pictures and verbal stimuli and that semantic access is independent of the modality 
of the stimulus in these regions. Thus, these regions could serve as potential sites where we may 
see interaction in processing across modalities. So my second method to determine the influence 
of semantics on visual processing is: given that semantic information, across modalities (pictures 
and words), accesses the same network of brain regions, can semantic information, activated via 
words, impact  pictorial processing. I will use time sensitive measures – event-related potentials 
(ERPs) to test whether semantics, accessed via a verbal cue, can quickly modulate aspects of 
visual processing, and, if so, hone in on when in the course of processing such effects arise.  
 
Our understanding, thus far, of how semantic information is stored and processed in the brain, 
across modalities, has been developed from a wide variety of studies spanning lesion studies, 
behavioral measures, electrophysiological measurements and neuroimaging. To gain a better 
understanding of the underlying semantic representations in the brain, I review the literature on 
semantics across modalities in Section 1.1. The neural mechanisms of feedback processing in the 
visual system, that can serve as pathways for semantics to interact with visual processing are 
discussed in Section 1.2. 
 
 
1.1. Processing pictures and words in the brain. 
 
We do evoke similar concepts when viewing a picture (eg. picture of a beach), or reading the 
word (eg. beach). It is natural to ask if these two different input types, pictures and written words 
(or even words listened to), are processed similarly to give rise to a common concept. Research 
on processing these input types has led to two dominant views in the literature: the multi-code 
view (Paivio, 1974; Warrington and Shalice, 1984), wherein pictures and words are processed in 
completely different ways with different memory stores and different representational codes; and 
the common code view, which suggests that pictures and words have common memory stores 
and have shared representational codes (Pylyshyn, 1973; Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, & Romani, 
1990). Recent work (discussed below), from measures of brain activity, is converging on the 
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common code view. This provides a framework to examine the interaction of semantics on visual 
processing, as the multi-code processing mechanism, wherein processing meaning from words 
and pictures constitute two completely separate systems, would allow minimal interactions 
between the two processing systems (Paivio, 1974). Thus, the possibility of a common code 
framework, indicating similar patterns of activity across pictures and words, will also allow for 
interaction between these two systems. The current research points to similar patterns of neural 
activity between pictures and words and we now examine the evidence, from Event Related 
Potentials (ERPs) and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), that supports this 
viewpoint. 
 
ERPs provide a continuous and instantaneous measure of electrical activity in the brain (Münte, 
Urbach, Düzel, & Kutas, 2000) and have helped us better understand cognitive processing in the 
brain. The N400 ERP component (Kutas and Hillyard, 1980), is known to index semantic access 
across a variety of modalities (words, sentences, pictures, sounds, gestures, cartoons), with 
stimuli congruent (“sugar”) with the semantic context being facilitated (“I take my coffee with 
cream and sugar”) and stimuli that are incongruent (“dog”) to the semantic context are not 
facilitated (“I take my coffee with cream and dog”), resulting in greater negativities, in the N400 
amplitude, for incongruent stimuli in (see review Kutas and Federmeier, 2011). The time-
window when the semantics or meaning is extracted from a stimulus is processed has been 
determined to be in the time-window of 350-500 ms (Kutas and Hillyard, 1980; also see review 
Kutas and Federmeier, 2011). The N400 is thus well suited to study the time-course of semantic 
processing in different modalities and determine if similar patterns of responses occur when 
semantics is accessed by different stimulus modalities or input types (e.g. pictures and words). If 
a common-code exists, the pattern of N400 should have similarities across modalities or input 
types. Indeed, a variety of studies show a similarity in the pattern of the N400 amplitude: for 
sentences (Kutas and Hillyard, 1980); written words (Kutas, 1993); for written sentences with 
the last words sometimes replaced with a  picture (Federmeier and Kutas, 2001; Nigam et al., 
1992); spoken sentences with pictures (congruent or incongruent) simultaneously displayed 
when the critical noun (congruent or incongruent) is manipulated (Willems, Özyürek, & 
Hagoort, 2008); static images (Holcomb & Mcpherson, 1994); and video clips (Sitnikova, 
Holcomb, Kiyonaga, & Kuperberg, 2008). Given the same pattern of N400 amplitude responses 
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to semantic processing under these different modalities, ERPs provide strong evidence that a 
common code exists across modalities. There are some scalp distributional differences between 
modalities, for example the N400 for words is distributed centro-parietally (Kutas, 1993), while 
for pictures it is fronto-central (Holcomb & Mcpherson, 1994; Federmeier and Kutas, 2001). 
Also, for pictures studies often show an earlier component, the N300, under certain conditions, 
that is related more to the form of the stimulus (see for example Holcomb & Mcpherson, 1994; 
Schendan and Kutas, 2002). Nevertheless, the common pattern of the N400 amplitude and it’s 
sensitivity to meaning, does provide evidence for a common code across modalities and input 
type. 
 
Neuroimaging, with its capability to localize brain regions, has provided some insights into the 
common code. A few studies have used paradigms with both picture and word stimuli, in the 
same experiment, to find brain areas that respond in common to pictures and words when these 
are processed for semantics (Kherif, Josse, & Price, 2010; Price, 2000; Vandenberghe, Price, 
Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996). Regions of the left inferior frontal gyrus, the left fusiform 
gyrus and the angular gyrus have been shown to co-activate for pictures and words. In an 
experiment in which participants either viewed pictures of tools and animals or read words or 
text about tools and animals (Chao et al., 1999), the brain regions not only overlapped across 
pictures and words, but they also showed a more fine-grained similarity in terms of which 
categories activated which part of the brain. The ventral fusiform region showed activity for 
animals (pictures or words) and the posterior lateral temporal region showed activity for tools 
(pictures or words). Thus, these studies provide evidence that some brain regions show a 
common activation across pictures and words.  
 
Common activity in a brain region, however, does not imply common representation, as the 
underlying neurons in these areas could process information differently for the different 
modalities. A better technique to find common code is to examine the patterns of neural activity 
for the two modalities. Two approaches have been used to perform MVPA (Norman, Polyn, 
Detre, & Haxby, 2006): cross-decoding (Kaplan et al., 2015) and representational similarity 
analysis (RSA) (Nili et al., 2014). In cross-decoding, a classifier is trained on the BOLD signal 
from one input type (eg. pictures) and then predicts the category of the stimulus from the BOLD 
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signal in another input type (eg. words). If cross-decoding is successful, the representations 
across the input types share a common hyperplane separating categories, and thus are similar. 
We can consider this to be a first order isomorphism (Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini, 2008) 
between the different input types. An alternative technique, RSA, uses the BOLD signal and 
computes distances between categories by computing a distance metric between signals. This 
distance is then compared to a similar distance metric computed from the signal in the other 
input type. If the metrics computed across input types are highly correlated, then the underlying 
neural representations across input type must be similar. This comparison provides a second 
order isomorphism between input types as not only are distances for a category across input 
types are computed, but also the distances between categories across input types. These two 
MVPA techniques thus can provide a more accurate inference on the existence of a common 
code as compared to univariate analysis. 
 
Using cross-decoding, studies have shown common patterns of activity in the categorization of 
pictures of objects and nouns describing them (Fairhall and Caramazza, 2013; Shinkareva et al., 
2011). This common pattern of activity is seen in frontal regions, regions associated with higher 
order visual processing and the angular gyrus. Using RSA (Devereux et al., 2003; Liuzzi et al., 
2015; Bruffaerts et al., 2013) on object stimuli, representational similarity has been found in 
multiple brain regions across a variety of input types (written words, auditory words and 
pictures) thus providing a second order isomorphism between pictures and other input types for 
object categories. As compared to univariate analysis, these results provide stronger evidence for 
the existence of a common code for pictures and words in some brain regions. 
 
Despite the use of MVPA techniques, there are some limitations in the existing literature in 
showing similar patterns of activity across input types (eg. pictures and written words). The 
stimuli chosen, for example animals versus tools, have preferential activity in separate brain 
regions (see Chao et al., 1999). Thus, decoding these categories in a region could be 
accomplished by a classifier even if the underlying neural code was dissimilar across input types, 
the mean signal for each category would be sufficient for the decoder to perform the task. What 
is lacking is showing similarity at a high local resolution, where different categories co-activate a 
local region. In this case, the existence of similar patterns of activation across input types must 
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necessarily be resolved in a higher dimensional space and thus provide a stronger measure of a 
common code across input types. Furthermore, little is known about the semantics of natural 
scenes as most studies have focused on objects (Devereux et al., 2013; Liuzzi et al., 2015; 
Bruffaerts et al., 2013; Fairhall and Caramazza, 2013; Shinkareva et al., 2011). Natural scenes 
are not only processed differently than objects (Oliva and Torralba, 2001; Greene and Oliva, 
2009), they also co-activate local regions such as the parahippocampal place area (PPA) and 
retrosplenial cortex (RSC) across categories (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998). Thus, they can 
prove to be good a stimulus set to check for the existence of a common code at better spatial 
resolution as compared to object categories.     
 
In addition to knowing that a common-code across input types exists in a brain region, a related 
question is what is the nature of representation in regions where we do find a common code 
(Martin, 2007; Patterson et al., 2007). Understanding the underlying representation will give us 
better insights into which regions can contribute to the interaction of semantics and visual 
processing ongoing. One view is that semantic information is represented in a completely amodal 
format, abstracted from the input type (Lambon Ralph & Patterson, 2008; Patterson et al., 2007). 
Another view is that semantic information is stored as a combination of sensory and functional 
attributes in sensory motor systems that preferentially represent each sensory feature (Chao et al., 
1999; Martin, 2007; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010). The MVPA studies have found common 
code regions in sensory motor systems, as well as in areas not traditionally attributed to sensory 
motor systems, such as the angular gyrus (Devereux et al., 2013; Liuzzi et al., 2015; Bruffaerts et 
al., 2013; Fairhall and Caramazza, 2013; Shinkareva et al., 2011). Thus, the data suggests that 
common-code regions can span sensory-motor regions as well as regions where information can 
be abstracted away from the stimulus input type. The question does remain, what is the nature of 
the representation in sensory-motor systems, that do represent a common-code, is it abstract or 
sensory-motor specific? 
 
In this section, I have reviewed the evidence for the existence of a common-code for pictures and 
words. MVPA studies (Devereux et al., 2013; Liuzzi et al., 2015; Bruffaerts et al., 2013; Fairhall 
and Caramazza, 2013; Shinkareva et al., 2011) have gone beyond showing just overlapping brain 
regions and have provide a better measure of the common-code. These studies have used simple 
	 7	
objects as their stimuli. In my thesis, I extend this work using natural scenes (Chapter 2). Also, 
these studies show multiple brain regions that represent information as common codes. These 
regions could potentially serve as sites for the interaction of semantics with visual processing. 
We next review the possible dynamics of the interaction of semantics with visual processing. 
 
1.2 The Dynamics of Semantic Processing  
 
To better understand the dynamics of the influence of semantics on visual processing, in this 
section we review the current state of what we know about the time-scale of semantic processing 
and the possible neural pathways that could enable its interaction with visual processing. 
Semantic processing in the brain is dynamic and is modulated by the context we are in, for 
example in the frame of reference of humans being attacked, we may put a snake and a bear in 
the same group, but if we are making size judgements, we will put the snake and bear in separate 
groups. Thus our context influences what features of the stimulus we make relevant under a 
particular context, and this choice can be influenced dynamically. The question remains, does 
this semantic information interact with visual processing? If so, at what time scale? These 
aspects of semantic processing are less understood and we examine what we currently know 
about the timescales of semantic processing and the dynamic neural pathways that could enable 
semantics to interact with visual processing. 
 
At what timescales can semantics and visual processing interact? Using ERPs, particularly the 
N400 component, we have reliable and precise estimates of the time-course of semantic 
processing. The time-window when the semantics or meaning is extracted from a stimulus 
(words, sentences, pictures, sounds, gestures, cartoons) is processed has been determined to be 
no later than the time-window of 350-500 ms (Kutas and Hillyard, 1980; also see review Kutas 
and Federmeier, 2011). The time-scales at which visual processing takes place is approximately 
0-300 ms from stimulus onset (Luck and Kappenman, 2011), starting with visual evoked 
potentials, that are sensitive to low level visual properties such as contrast, luminance and spatial 
frequency, in the following time-windows: the C1 50-70 ms, the P1 ~100 ms and the N1 ~130 
ms (Schechter et al., 2005). Attentional mechanisms can modulate some of these visual 
processes, with the P1 and N1 components showing modulation in the time-window 100-250 ms 
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(Gonzalez, Clark, Fan, Luck, & Hillyard, 1994). Visual object processing is reflected in the 
N170 component for faces (Carmel and Bentin, 2002) and in the N250 component that indexes 
the identification of familiar objects (Scott, Tanaka, Sheinberg, & Curran, 2006). The larger 
scale structure of pictorial stimuli is indexed by the N300 component in the time-window 200-
350 ms (Schendan and Kutas, 2002). Given these time-windows, 0-350 ms for visual processing 
and 350-500 ms for semantic processing, there are a few time points at which semantic 
processing and visual processing could interact. The first possibility is that semantic and visual 
processing occur in parallel and their interactions would occur during the course of their mutual 
processing; this type of interaction could occur anywhere in the time-window from 100-500 ms. 
The second possibility is that semantic cues, based on the context of the experimental situation, 
could pre-activate expected visual properties and modulate the processing of the incoming 
stimulus. It is this latter case that is of special interest as semantic evaluation of the incoming 
stimulus has not started, but expected semantic features, spanning modalities and input types, 
have been pre-activated by semantic context, initiated by words that do not bear any perceptual 
resemblance to the pictures, and the question remains can these pre-activated features modulate 
visual processing of the incoming stimulus, across the input type. This modulation of visual 
processing would need to occur in the first 350 ms, as visual processing has not been completed 
by then. There is already some evidence that this early modulation of visual processing occurs: 
semantic information can set up an upstream expectancy for perceptual features as early as 200 
ms into processing (Federmeier and Kutas, 2001). In this thesis, I will use this paradigm (with no 
precuing in Chapter 3 and with precuing a scene category in Chapter 4) to answer the question: 
Can semantics modulate visual processing? 
 
For semantics to modulate visual processing, there must exist pathways from semantic 
processing regions to visual regions or mechanisms for visual regions to be pre-activated by 
semantics. We discussed the existence of semantic regions, that process information independent 
of modality (Section 1.1). Current neuroimaging studies implicate several brain regions in the 
processing of semantic information. The angular gyrus, regions of the left lateral and ventral 
temporal cortex anterior to visual associative regions, left dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, left 
inferior frontal gyrus, left ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, and the posterior cingulate gyrus have 
been found to process semantic information for verbal stimuli ((Fairhall and Caramazza, 2013; 
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Binder et al., 2009). How are these semantic regions connected to modality specific regions? We 
do not yet have all the details of how information flows between a subset of these regions, or the 
nature of any recurrent interactions within each region. In the case of pre-activating semantics 
via a verbal cue, the cue can pre-activate expected features higher visual areas as these regions 
have shown to be multi-modal in nature. Thus, feedback between semantics and visual 
processing can occur at localized regions in the visual processing stream. An alternate 
mechanism for semantic preactivation to modulate visual processing, is through the tuning of a 
population of neurons to a particular category, for example if we attend to animals then multiple 
brain regions tune themselves to select features from animal categories as opposed to anything 
else (Çukur, Nishimoto, Huth, & Gallant, 2013). This mechanism ensures that multiple brain 
regions are ready to process information that has been pre-activated and could also cause extra 
processing to occur, if a stimulus other than the expected is shown. We study these effects in 
Chapter 4, where we use a paradigm wherein we match or mismatch the stimulus to the precue 
and observe the differences in the ERP waveforms to these conditions.  
 
In addition to feedback pathways for pre-activated semantics, there are some plausible pathways 
for real time information transfer between semantic regions and visual areas. We do know that 
some semantic selection happens in the pre-frontal cortex (Martin, 2007; Binder, Desai, Graves, 
& Conant, 2009). The pre-frontal cortex could receive information very rapidly after stimulus 
onset via magnocellular pathways (Kveraga et al., 2007) and provide feedback through direct 
and cascading connections from the pre-frontal cortex to the left temporal lobe and to extra-
striate and striate cortex (Gilbert and Li, 2013). In addition, one source of the neural generator of 
the N400, which reflects semantic access, has been shown to be in the temporal sulcus and the 
anterior temporal lobe (Halgren et al., 2002). These regions can easily feedback into nearby areas 
such as the parahippocampal gyrus and aid in visual processing. Thus, although the pathways  
for feedback from semantics into visual processing exist, we do not yet have all the details of 
how information flows between a subset of these regions, or the nature of any recurrent 
interactions within each region at these time scales.  
 
A majority of the research in relation to semantics and visual processing has been done with 
isolated objects. In this work, I extend this knowledge into understanding the semantic 
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representations of natural scenes and their dynamic interaction with visual perception. Natural 
scenes are defined as photographs one would take of our surrounding environment without any 
alterations, for example a picture of a beach or a city street. They have high ecological validity as 
we live for the most part in these environments, yet they have not been as extensively studied as 
isolated objects. What we do know is that different natural scene categories co-activate visual 
regions, PPA and RSC (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998), thus providing a more local specificity to 
the representations than studies using disparate objects (e.g. animals vs tools) that are known to 
activate disparate regions. In addition, we are well versed with what a typical natural scene for a 
category looks like (for example a beach). I will use both these aspects, the overlapping local co-
activations of natural scenes in the brain and how well versed we are with natural scenes, to 
study the influence of semantics on the visual processing of natural scenes. In Chapter 2, I 
provide evidence that a common code exists for pictures and words describing natural scene 
images. This common representation is found not only in semantic processing regions but also in 
higher visual areas. Do these shared representations influence each other dynamically? In 
Chapter 3, to make contact with semantic representations, or prior knowledge, I use 
representativeness of natural scenes as an attribute to understand how and when does prior 
knowledge modulate visual processing. In Chapter 4, I use written words to precue categories 
and try and understand the dynamic interaction of semantics and the visual processing of natural 
scenes.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Evidence For Similar Patterns of Neural Activity Elicited by Picture- and Word-based 
Representations of Natural Scenes1 
	
 
2.1. Introduction 
Seeing a furry, four legged animal with a wagging tail, hearing the sound of barking, and reading 
the word “dog” all evoke a (subjectively) common concept in our minds. What neural processes 
allow this common concept to emerge from processing that is initially modality and stimulus 
specific? A long-standing question is whether a common concept arises because these different 
stimuli all ultimately access the same representation – that is, elicit the same pattern of neural 
activity.  In other words, is there a “common code” for semantic information in the brain that can 
be accessed from multiple modalities and stimulus types? 
 
 Before addressing the possibility of a common code, researchers needed to identify areas 
involved in representing conceptual information. Initially, univariate fMRI methods were used to 
find candidate brain regions important for conceptual/semantic processing. For example, 
researchers contrasted activity evoked by real words and pseudowords (which are perceptually 
like real words but lack learned semantics) or strings of consonants. This literature uncovered a 
distributed network of brain regions involved in semantic processing, including regions of lateral 
and ventral temporal cortex anterior to visual associative regions, the angular gyrus, the left 
inferior frontal gyrus, left dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, left ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, 
																																								 																				
1	This	chapter	has	been	accepted	for	publication:	Kumar	et	al.,	(in	press),	NeuroImage.	
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and the posterior cingulate gyrus (see review by Binder et al., 2009). Other studies have used 
pictorial stimuli (Chao et al., 1999; see review by Martin, 2007) and found a similarly distributed 
network of brain regions.  A few studies have used paradigms with both types of stimuli to find 
brain areas that respond to both pictures and words when these are processed for semantics, 
getting slightly closer to the search for a common semantic code. Repetition suppression has 
been shown in the left fusiform region for both pictures and words (Kherif et al., 2010), and 
regions similar to the semantic network discussed above are activated by both pictures and words 
(Vandenberghe et al., 1996). Collectively, this work has revealed that there are a number of brain 
regions that are activated during the semantic analysis of words and pictures, and, based on these 
studies, some have proposed a model of semantic representation for concrete objects that is 
distributed across multiple regions, including sensory and motor systems (Martin, 2007; 
Pulvermuller and Fadiga, 2010). 
 
Although these studies point to a distributed “common store” for semantic information, they are 
not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a common semantic code. It is possible that the 
same brain areas become active when meaning is extracted from multiple input modalities and/or 
types, but that these brain regions nonetheless process each differently -- for example, using 
different subpopulations of neurons for each stimulus type. Thus, evidence for a common code in 
a particular region requires not only finding areas of common activation but also showing that 
different input modalities evoke similar representations, or shared patterns of activity, within 
those areas.  To obtain this kind of evidence, the literature has turned to multi-voxel pattern 
analysis (MVPA; see review by Kaplan et al., 2015).  
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MVPA affords the ability to move beyond the extant univariate-based evidence supporting a 
common store by asking whether words and pictures evoke similar patterns of activation. For 
example, one can train a classifier on the pattern of activity from one type of stimulus (e.g., 
pictures) and attempt to then classify the pattern of activity elicited by a different stimulus type 
(e.g., words). We refer to this cross-modal training and testing of a classifier as “cross-
decoding”. Such studies have been performed using a variety of modalities (words and pictures: 
Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013; Shinkareva et al., 2011; pictures, written words, spoken words and 
natural sounds: Simanova et al., 2014). A few other studies have used Representational 
Similarity Analysis (RSA; Nili et al., 2014), a technique that uses distances between vectors 
(built from semantic feature lists or from the BOLD signal) to determine similarities between 
categories, in order to assess similarity in semantic representations across modalities (auditory 
words and pictures: Devereux et al., 2003; Liuzzi et al., 2015; written words and pictures: 
Bruffaerts et al., 2013). From these studies, cross-modal effects have been primarily detected in 
the left hemisphere: in the precuneus (lPrecu), posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG), inferior 
parietal sulcus (lIPS), precentral gyrus (lPCG), fusiform gyrus (lFG) and the inferior temporal 
gyrus (lITG).  
 
The use of MVPA and RSA methods, then, have provided evidence that within the distributed 
semantic network, there are commonalities in the patterns of activation that are elicited by 
similar concepts across different forms of representation. There are two limitations of the extant 
literature on cross-modal representations utilizing MVPA methods. First, in comparison to 
MVPA studies in a single modality that explore fine-grained object categories (e.g. Kreigeskorte 
et al., 2007; Eger, Ashburner, Haynes, Dolan, & Rees, 2008; Borghesani et al., 2016), studies on 
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cross-modal representations have tended to use stimulus sets that varied across important 
semantic dimensions, such as animacy, size, and function (although see Bruffaerts et al., 2013 
for a notable exception). Because of the substantive differences in their functional and motor 
affordances, some of these categories (e.g., tools and dwellings) activate clearly separate brain 
structures: e.g., dorsal motor regions in the case of tools versus ventral medial areas, such as the 
parahippocampal cortex, in the case of dwellings. In these cases, then, successful cross-decoding 
may reflect representational similarity at a fairly coarse level; that is, successful cross-decoding 
can reflect the fact that the objects activate very different regions of cortex. A more stringent 
measure of a common code in the brain would be to show representational similarity across 
categories that activate common brain. The few studies that have included fine-grained category 
distinctions (Fairhall and Caramzza, 2013; Bruffaerts et al., 2013) have been limited to 
individual objects as opposed to large-scale navigable natural scenes, which brings us to the 
second limitation of this literature. If we are interested in identifying cross-modal 
representations, such representations should extend beyond the object domain. Here, therefore, 
we sought to extend the cross-modal literature to natural scene categories, using four outdoor 
scene categories (beaches, cities, highways and mountains) known to activate very similar 
regions of cortex (Walther et al., 2009), making cross-decoding in those regions non trivial. 
Here, cross-decoding of category membership across representation type (pictures and words) 
must occur in a higher dimensional space (i.e. at a higher resolution) than for stimulus sets 
containing categories that show markedly different levels of activation across different brain 
regions. In other words, successful cross-decoding -- training classifiers on one modality and 
testing on another -- among these categories would necessarily imply locally similar neural 
patterns (i.e. within a restricted region of interest) between pictures and words. 
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Thus, in the present experiment, participants were scanned while they viewed full color 
photographs of real world scenes and, extending prior work that has mostly used single words 
(nouns), read two word phrases that described those categories of natural scenes (e.g. 'beautiful 
seashore'). By varying the specific noun that was used (e.g., seashore, beach, seaside) and pairing 
these with a range of adjectives (e.g., beautiful, humid, sandy), we provided a richer semantic 
stimulus while minimizing adaptation effects that might arise through simple repetition of just 
the category word (e.g. 'beach'). To test for evidence of a common semantic code (here, across 
pictures and words) and, more generally, to elucidate the semantic network involved in 
understanding natural scenes, we performed a cross-decoding analysis through the entire brain 
using a whole brain searchlight (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006). If we can successfully cross-decode 
from pictures to words and words to pictures, this would show that the category representations 
accessed from the two modalities is locally similar -- thus better supporting the existence of a 
common code. 
 
2.2 Experimental Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
Nine subjects (5 females and 4 males; two of the subjects were authors on the paper) participated 
in the study, which was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Illinois. 
A tenth subject was dropped prior to analysis because his vision in the scanner had been 
uncorrected. All participants were in good health, with no past history of psychiatric or 
neurological diseases, and all gave their written, informed consent. The nine included subjects 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
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2.2.2 Visual stimuli and experimental design 
Scene stimuli consisted of 64 distinct color images from each of four categories: beaches, cities, 
highways, and mountains, using images drawn from a similar set as Walther et al. (2009), which 
were downloaded from the Internet. Photographs were chosen to capture the high variability 
within each scene category. 
 
Word stimuli consisted of 64 two-word phrases in each of the four categories. The first word in 
each phrase was an adjective and the second word was a noun (see Appendix A). Adjectives 
appropriate to each category were chosen. The adjectives were matched for word length and 
word log-frequency across all the categories using the celex database (Baayen et al., 1993). We 
chose three synonyms for the nouns in each category to make the phrases different and more 
engaging across the trials (beach category: beach, seaside and seashore; city category: city, town 
and downtown; highway category: highway, freeway and interstate; mountain category: 
mountain, peak and summit). The two-word phrases were unique within a category. Words were 
presented in a white font on a black background. Stimulus presentation and experimental design 
was controlled using the Psychophysical Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 
1998;) in MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, Massachusetts). 
 
Scene stimuli  (800 x 600 pixels; subtending 14.3° x 10.4° of visual angle) or word stimuli (each 
letter was 1.04° in height and the word width ranged from 2.4° to 11.2°; presented using Arial 
font at 60 point size), were back projected on a screen viewed through a mirror from the bore of 
the scanner, using a projector operating at a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The experiment consisted of 
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16 runs alternating between the two conditions: the word condition consisting of the phrases and 
the picture condition consisting of images of scenes. Each run was comprised of eight blocks 
interleaved with 12 s fixation periods to allow the hemodynamic response to return to baseline 
levels. The first fixation period of each run was 20 seconds. Each category was presented twice 
in a run (4 categories x 2) and the order of categories was randomized across blocks, with the 
same order being preserved across pairs of word and picture runs. The starting run was 
counterbalanced between the two conditions, words and pictures, across subjects. Each block 
consisted of four presentations of pictures or word phrases from the same category.   
 
In the picture condition, each scene image was displayed for 1 second with an inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI) of 1 second, for a total block length of 8 seconds (Figure 2.1A). In the word 
condition, each phrase was presented one word at a time (Note that, as this was a block design, 
subjects also knew the category of the noun when the adjectives were being presented). Each 
word was presented for a duration of 400 ms followed by a fixation period of 200 ms (Figure 
2.1B). The total time for each phrase was 1000 ms, matching the time that the picture stimulus 
was displayed. An inter-stimulus interval of 1 second was maintained in the word runs, again 
matching that in the picture runs. The list of phrases for each category were grouped into sets of 
four (see Appendix A), and displayed for each block. Subjects always saw these sets of phrases 
as a block, with the sequence of phrases within a block being randomized across subjects. The 
presentation of these sets was randomized for each participant. A fixation cross was presented 
throughout each block, and subjects were instructed to maintain fixation. Subjects were 
instructed to view the pictures and read and think about the phrases silently. For one subject, the 
experiment was repeated at a later date due to a scanner error in the original session. Only data 
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from the second session was analyzed. 
 
2.2.3 MRI acquisition and preprocessing 
Imaging data were acquired with a 3 tesla Siemens Trio Scanner equipped for echo planar 
imaging. A gradient echo, echoplanar sequence was used to obtain functional images (volume 
repetition time (TR), 2 s; echo time (TE), 30 ms; flip angle, 90°; matrix, 64 x 64 voxels; FOV, 
190 mm; 29 axial 3 mm slices with a gap of 1 mm; inplane resolution, 2.97 x 2.97 mm). We 
collected a high resolution (1x1x1.2 mm voxels) structural scan (MPRAGE; TR, 1.9 s; TE, 2.25 
ms, flip angle, 9°) in each scanning session to assist in registering our echo planar imaging 
images with localizer masks and a brain atlas.  
 
2.2.4 Preprocessing of Imaging Data 
We used the AFNI software suite (Cox, 1996) to pre-process our data. Motion correction was 
performed using the AFNI function 3dVolreg with options for zero padding (-zpad 4) and all 
volumes were registered to a volume in the 8th run. Our criteria were to reject any movement 
greater than 3mm and our subjects’ head movements were under that threshold. The data were 
then normalized by subtracting the temporal mean of each run from the signal, dividing the result 
by the mean and multiplying the result by 100.  This normalized signal was used for MVPA. No 
smoothing or any other pre-processing was done. 
 
2.2.5 MVPA Searchlight Analysis 
We performed a whole brain searchlight analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006), using MVPA to 
build a classifier to discriminate stimuli category (beaches, cities, highways and mountains) 
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within a modality (words or pictures). In keeping with previous searchlight analyses of the scene 
network (Baldassano, Fei-Fei, & Beck, 2016), we defined a spherical template (radius of 7 mm), 
which contained 57 voxels (of size 2.97mm x 2.97mm x 3mm). These spherical voxel sets were 
built through the entire brain, with an 8mm center to center spacing. Voxels that fell outside the 
brain were omitted from the analysis. The fMRI data for these voxels, four data points per 
stimulus block, were extracted from the time series with a time lag of four seconds to 
approximate the lag in the hemodynamic response. In total we had acquired 256 brain volumes 
while viewing the pictures and word stimuli (1 session x 8 runs x 8 blocks x 4 images x 2 
seconds presentation time/2 seconds TR). This extracted signal for each voxel set was fed as an 
input for pattern analysis.  
 
A first step in the pattern analysis was to split the data into training and test sets. We followed 
leave-one-run-out cross validation (LORO) with 7 of the 8 runs being used as the training set and 
the left out run being used as the test set. We next scaled the data, which helps improve support 
vector machine (SVM) classifier performance (Chang and Lin, 2011), by normalizing the 
training data (7 runs) with respect to the mean and standard deviation of these seven runs. These 
same normalization parameters were used to normalize the data from the left out (8th) run. A 
SVM classifier was built (LIBSVM v3.11, linear kernel, C=0.01) using the training data set and 
trained to assign the correct scene category labels to the voxel activation patterns. The data from 
the test data set (8th run) was then presented to the trained classifier, which generated predictions 
of the class labels. In 8 repetitions of this procedure, for each condition (Words and Pictures), 
each of the 8 runs was left out once. For each repetition, the accuracy was calculated by counting 
the number of correctly classified stimuli for a category and dividing it by the total number of 
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actual stimuli for that category. Then, the mean of the accuracy across all the 8 repetitions was 
taken as the decoding accuracy for that voxel set for a condition (Word or Picture). The decoding 
accuracy for each template location was stored at the center voxel. By repeating this process for 
every voxel set, we obtained a brain mask of decoding accuracies for each subject.  
 
To look for similarities across the group of subjects, we subjected the individual decoding maps 
to a group analysis.  For the group analysis, we registered the decoding accuracy maps, 
converting them into 2mm x 2mm x 2mm maps for each subject into the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) space using the AFNI toolbox (Cox, 1996) @adwarp function. The @adwarp 
function transforms volumes from the subject space to the MNI space. We calculated the group 
mean using the AFNI 3dMean function across all subjects. 
 
The pattern analysis procedure was slightly modified for cross-decoding. In this case we trained 
on one condition (e.g. Words) but tested on the other condition (e.g. Pictures). LORO cross-
validation was again used, with training on 7 runs for one condition and testing on the 
corresponding 8th run for the other condition, and the decoding accuracy was determined as 
above. 
 
2.2.6 Permutation Test 
To determine an appropriate significance level for our classification results, we computed an 
expected distribution of classification errors by performing a permutation test (Mukherjee et al., 
2003) with one thousand iterations, in which we randomized our category labels for the stimulus 
set and performed classification with these random labels. We executed this permutation test 
	 21	
separately for straight-decoding (pictures, words) and cross-decoding (words to pictures and 
pictures to words) for each subject.  For each iteration of the permutation test, we calculated a 
group mean by transforming each subject's data into MNI space (see Group Analysis). Because 
the labels are randomly permuted, the 1000 resulting decoding scores per voxel provide a good 
estimate of the expected distribution of results under the null hypothesis for that voxel.  To 
correct for multiple comparisons, from each of these 1000 group maps, we identified an accuracy 
threshold that resulted in clusters of voxels, for a given cluster size, in less than 5% of the maps. 
In this manner, we determined the minimum decoding accuracy associated with a p<.05 for each 
of the straight-decoding and cross-decoding analyses, for a total of four values. From these four 
values, to be conservative, we chose the highest cutoff value (i.e. 27.75% from the straight-
decoding for words) that was considered significant at p<0.05, for a cluster size of 100 voxels. 
Our decoding and cross-decoding accuracy maps hence show decoding accuracies with a 
minimum threshold at 27.75%. We also performed a permutation test for a larger cluster size of 
400 voxels: there, the cutoff accuracy for a p<.05 threshold was 27.0%. Similar results were 
obtained for a larger cluster size of 400 voxels, but we do see a few more areas in ventral 
temporal cortex at a threshold of 27% (see Appendix B). To adopt a more conservative approach, 
we report all results with the higher threshold -- a cluster size of 100 voxels and a minimum 
threshold of 27.75%, with the results for a cluster size of 400 voxels reported in Appendix A2. 
 
2.2.7 Cross-decoding intersection maps 
We created intersection maps of the two cross-decoding conditions (train on pictures, test on 
words; train on words, test on pictures) by intersecting the resulting maps from the group 
analysis. Our logic was that with respect to the idea that words and pictures produce a common 
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code, both of these directions of cross-decoding are equally valid.  Regions that show above 
chance cross-decoding for both analyses thus represent stronger candidates for containing a 
common code. 
  
2.2.8 Calculating Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
As a preliminary analysis to assess our ability to detect an effect in the left Anterior Temporal 
Lobe (lATL), we computed the temporal signal to noise ratio (tSNR) in this region. In a region 
implicated in cross-modal representations (Binney et al., 2010) we created a 7mm sphere of 
voxels centered at coordinates (MNI: -39, -9, -36). This was transformed into each subject’s 
space, and the tSNR (Friedman et al., 2006) was computed by calculating the temporal mean in 
each voxel and diving it by the standard deviation of the signal. The tSNR was also computed for 
other clusters that showed cross-decoding to serve as a comparison with the lATL, which is 
known to suffer from distortion and signal loss. We found, as expected, that the left ATL (MNI: -
39, -9, -36) had the lowest tSNR (mean tSNR for picture runs = 42.92 and mean tSNR for phrase 
runs = 43.02) of all our cross-decoding regions (mean tSNR for picture runs range from 92.97 to 
111.87; mean tSNR for phrase runs range from 96.93 to 114.24). 
 
2.3. Results 
Our goal was to assess whether there is representational similarity in the concepts evoked by 
pictures and words for natural scenes. To determine if pictures of natural scenes and phrases that 
evoke those scene categories share common representations, we used SVM to distinguish 
between four categories (beaches, cities, highways and mountains) under two conditions: 
straight-decoding or cross-decoding. Straight decoding, in which the classifier is trained and 
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tested on stimuli from one modality (e.g. pictures) will highlight regions that contain category 
information for a given modality. Cross-decoding, in which the classifier is trained on stimuli 
from one modality (e.g. pictures) but makes category predictions on a stimulus set from another 
modality (e.g. words), will then allow us to ask whether there are shared patterns of activation 
across the two modalities. If the different modalities share a common representation, cross-
decoding should lead to above chance category prediction accuracies; that is, the pattern of 
activity evoked by pictures and words should be similar.  
 
2.3.1 Representational Similarity: Cross-decoding  
We used cross-decoding from pictures to words and words to pictures to test for representational 
similarity between pictures and words describing natural scenes across the entire brain.  Because 
a priori we have no reason to value one direction of cross-decoding (e.g. train on pictures, test on 
words) over the other (e.g. train on words, test on pictures), we produced a combined map 
(Figure 2.2; Table 2.1) of both directions (an approach recommended by Kaplan et al., (2015)) 
by intersecting the individual maps (see Appendix D for cross-decoding maps in each direction). 
The resulting maps show regions with above chance cross-decoding both from pictures to words 
and words to pictures, ignoring regions that do not cross-decode in both directions (Figure 2.2). 
We see successful cross-decoding in a variety of regions, including putative visual areas -- the 
parahippocampal region, the retrosplenial complex (RSC) and the precuneus -- as well as regions 
attributed to semantic processing -- the angular gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus and the middle 
frontal gyrus. We note that successful decoding was not driven by any particular category; ROI 
analyses showed no significant differences across categories (see Appendix C for confusion 
matrices and BOLD signal data for regions with more than 100 voxels). A similar set of 
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distributed brain regions has also been seen in studies using pictures of objects and related nouns 
(Devereux et al., 2013; Simanova et al., 2014). Importantly, the successful cross-decoding in 
these regions implies that they contain a common code for semantic category across pictures and 
words. 
 
Although we see above chance cross-decoding in large portions of the brain, we do not see 
significant cross-decoding in early visual cortex (Figure 2.2). Such a result, however, is to be 
expected given the visual features the stimuli (words vs pictures) share no commonalities. 
Interestingly, though, we do see cross decoding in later putative visual areas, the PPA and the 
RSC.  Such data are consistent with recent findings indicating that semantic knowledge impacts 
visual detection (Caddigan et al., 2010; Greene et al., 2015). We also see cross-decoding in the 
caudal inferior parietal lobule (cIPL), a region we have recently argued might be part of a two-
network model of scene perception (Baldassano, Esteva, Fei-Fei, & Beck, 2016). Not only is the 
cIPL functionally connected to scene processing regions (Baldassano, Beck, & Fei-Fei, 2013), 
but it, has been implicated in straight-decoding for natural scenes (Walther et al., 2009), 
processing familiar scenes (Montaldi, D., Spencer, T. J., Roberts, N., & Mayes, A. R., 2006) and 
in tasks involving spatial learning and landmark navigation (Bray, Arnold, Levy, & Iaria, 2015). 
It has also been implicated in semantic representations (Devereux et al., 2013; Binder et al., 
2009) and has been argued to be a cross-modal hub (see review (Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, & 
Mishkin, 2011).  
 
2.3.2 Decoding of Pictures Only 
We also replicated previous results on decoding natural scene categories (Walther et al., 2009). 
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When training on picture stimuli and testing on untrained picture stimuli we saw above chance 
decoding of category (Figure 2.3A) bilaterally in: early visual cortex; higher visual regions in the 
medial temporal cortex including the parahippocampal place area (PPA) and the RSC; the lateral 
inferior temporal cortex; the inferior parietal lobule encompassing the precuneus, the posterior 
cingulate and the angular gyrus; the middle frontal gyrus; and the inferior frontal gyrus (p < 0.05, 
corrected). We also successfully decoded pictures in the perirhinal cortex, at the tip of the left 
anterior temporal lobe (ATL).  
 
2.3.3 Decoding of Words Only  
Two brain regions showed above chance decoding of category for words (p < 0.05, corrected): 
the left inferior frontal gyrus encompassing the pars Orbitalis, the pars Triangularis and pars 
Opercularis; and the left superior and inferior parietal lobule encompassing the precuneus 
(Figure 2.3B).  These brain regions have also been reported as part of the semantic network from 
univariate studies using verbal stimuli (Binder et al., 2009). We successfully decoded in only a 
subset of the regions previously implicated in semantic processing, and the reduction in number 
of areas relative to pictures is notable. A similar reduction in decoding areas for words, as 
compared to pictures, has been observed in other MVPA studies for objects (Fairhall & 
Caramazza, 2013; Simanova et al., 2014). These studies show widespread straight-decoding for 
pictures in extrastriate visual areas, but word decoding only in the left pMTG/ITG. This is 
perhaps not surprising given that pictures are a much richer visual stimulus than words. One 
notable difference from univariate studies of words referring to objects (Kherif, Josse, & Price, 
2010) is our failure to decode in the left lateral temporal cortex. We note, however, that natural 
scene categories are known to be represented in parahippocampal regions and not the lateral 
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temporal cortex (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998), and thus we might not expect to see the same 
areas as those implicated in object semantics. But even if we instead consider only our scene-
related areas, which do replicate prior work for natural scenes (Walther et al., 2009), we still do 
not see successful decoding of scene-related words in these areas. Of course, one cannot make 
too much of a failure to reject the null.  Indeed, successful cross-decoding between words and 
pictures was observed in these regions, suggesting that the regions do differentiate concepts 
evoked by words.   
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the cross-decoding map is considerably more extensive than 
that produced by straight-decoding of words.  This difference between cross-decoding and 
straight-decoding is also seen in other MVPA studies with words and pictures of objects (Fairhall 
& Caramazza, 2013; Simanova et al., 2014). At first glance this result may seem surprising; 
decoding is better between modalities than within a modality.  However, such a result is possible 
in MVPA when the signal from one modality (i.e. words) is more vulnerable to noise, resulting 
in poorer decision boundaries during training and patterns that can on occasion erroneously cross 
decision boundaries during test. The addition of a stronger signal (i.e. pictures) not only allows 
the SVM to construct better (i.e. more generalizable) decision boundaries during training but it 
also provides a clearer signal with respect to those boundaries during test.  Put succinctly, 
although the category signal is present for the words it does not always rise above the noise, but 
the presence of a stronger category signal from the pictures allows that relevant pattern to 
emerge more clearly. 
 
2.4. Discussion 
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We successfully cross-decoded between pictures of natural scenes and phrases that describe them 
in a distributed set of temporal, parietal, and frontal brain regions.  This cross-decoding implies a 
first-order similarity of neural representation across two different input types: The same patterns 
of activity that distinguish among visual scene categories distinguish among phrases describing 
the scene categories. Importantly, this cross-decoding was possible in small spatial windows, 
suggesting that the signals are locally similar across the pictures and words. Thus, our results go 
beyond showing simple overlap of processing in brain regions, and instead suggest the existence 
of a fine-grained common code in these regions. These multi-modal regions showing cross-
decoding include higher visual areas such as parahippocampal gyrus and the reterosplenial 
cortex, regions in the parietal cortex, including the precuneus, the angular gyrus and the inferior 
parietal lobule, and the middle frontal and inferior frontal gyrus. Notably, all these regions have 
been implicated in semantic processing in other studies using a single input type -- for example 
words (see review Binder et al., 2009) or pictures (see review Martin, 2007). Our results suggest 
that words and pictures not only co-activate these regions, but actually activate them in a similar 
way. 
 
We chose natural scene categories as our stimuli because they share many visual and semantic 
features and, not surprisingly, activate overlapping brain regions.  Successful cross-decoding 
among these categories, then, must not only rely on more subtle differences among categories 
but it also must occur in higher dimensional space (i.e., at higher spatial resolution) than 
categorizations across stimuli that have less overlap in their activations.  For example, dwellings 
and tools differentially activate large regions within the ventral visual cortex and premotor cortex 
(Chao et al., 1999; Martin & Chao, 2001).  Such large differences in mean activation allow a 
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classifier to differentiate these categories in low dimensional space -- that is, on the basis of 
which area is more activated. The same is true for other objects classes that show other large-
scale differences in activation, such as animate and non-animate object categories (Connolly et 
al., 2012). Thus, cross-decoding across words and pictures that include such object classes 
(Shinkareva et al., 2011; Simanova et al., 2014), does not imply a similarity of representation at 
as a high a spatial resolution as our natural scenes do. Successful cross-decoding of natural 
scenes in local regions thus brings us closer to a true measure of a common code.  
 
2.4.1 Cross-decoding of natural scenes vs. objects   
How do our cross-decoding results for scenes compare with those of prior studies using objects 
and nouns (Devereux et al., 2013; Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013; Simanova et al., 2014)? In the 
left hemisphere our cross-decoding regions were broadly similar to results for studies using 
objects (Devereux et al., 2013; Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013; Simanova et al., 2014). However, 
the cross-decoding regions in our study were more extensive in the right hemisphere than in 
previous work that used isolated objects (Devereux et al., 2013; Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013; 
Simanova et al., 2014). In particular, we found evidence for common semantic representations in 
the right angular gyrus and the right precuneus. Interestingly, these same regions are also seen in 
straight-decoding for pictures. Indeed, in our current study and in previous studies involving of 
natural scenes (Walther et al., 2009) we see more bilateral decoding of category for pictorial 
stimuli. Further work will be needed to examine the detailed properties that lead to differential 
engagement of the right hemisphere for isolated objects and natural scenes. 
 
Although the anterior temporal lobes (ATL) have been shown with MVPA techniques (Clarke & 
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Tyler, 2014) to process semantic information, we failed to find cross-decoding there. This 
previous study used only picture stimuli, however, raising the possibility that this region has a 
unimodal visual representation. Some have argued that representations in the anterior temporal 
lobe are not domain-general, with the left temporal pole processing verbal semantics but the right 
temporal pole processing non-verbal semantics (Mesulam et al., 2013), and, indeed, other studies 
using words and pictures of objects also failed to find a common representation across modalities 
in the anterior temporal lobe (Bruffaerts et al., 2013; Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013; Liuzzi et al., 
2015). However, on this account, we might still have expected to see bi-lateral straight-decoding 
in these areas, in the left for words and the right for pictures.  Instead, we found significant 
straight-decoding of pictures in just a small region in the left ATL. One study, using only picture 
stimuli, has shown that this region, and more specifically the perirhinal cortex, is preferentially 
engaged when there is a need to process fine semantic distinctions (i.e. highly confusable 
objects:  Clarke & Tyler, 2014). Although our scene categories overlap considerably in visual 
feature space, they are not highly confusable, and the perirhinal cortex therefore may have been 
less engaged in our experiment. A final consideration is that the poles of the ATL are particularly 
prone to fMRI susceptibility artifacts (Visser et al., 2010), and thus our failure to find significant 
decoding in those areas may simply be due to noise; we did not optimize our scanning protocol 
for the temporal poles. Indeed, tSNR in the ATL was the lowest of all the regions tested (see 
Experiment Methods, Section 2.8). In general, it is hard to draw conclusions about failures to 
find decoding. Thus, our main focus in this paper is to show that there are, indeed, some brain 
regions that do show cross-decoding at a high spatial resolution and therefore provide stronger 
evidence for a common semantic code. 
 
	 30	
2.4.2 Implications for models of semantic processing 
A number of different accounts of semantic processing have been proffered in the literature (for 
review, see Glaser, 1992; Lambon Ralph & Patterson, 2008; Thompson-Schill, 2003). Multi-
code models (reviewed in Barsalou et al., 2003; Thomspon-Schill, 2003) postulate that semantic 
information is represented as separate codes for each modality. For example, picture stimuli are 
represented by a completely different pattern of brain activity in a given brain region than are 
word stimuli that evoke the same concept.  In conjunction with other recent work that has found 
evidence for shared representations of semantics from verbal and nonverbal material (Fairhall & 
Caramazza, 2013; Shinkareva et al., 2011; Simanova et al., 2014) -- i.e., evidence for a common 
code – our results argue against purely multi-code accounts, although they are not incompatible 
with the view that some aspects of semantic processing are modality-specific, as we find some 
brain regions that only exhibit straight decoding. Our results further provide evidence that there 
exists a common code at a higher spatial resolution than has typically been shown.  
 
Common code models of semantic representation postulate that semantic information is 
represented in a form that is shared across modality and input type (Lambon Ralph & Patterson, 
2008).  Models of this type vary in whether they view the semantic system as consisting of a 
single amodal hub, for example the bilateral poles of the ATL, connected to a fronto-parietal 
semantic control system and also to modality specific sensory systems (Lambon Ralph & 
Patterson, 2008; Patterson et al., 2007), or distributed across brain regions (Martin, 2007) and in 
whether the shared code is taken to be fully abstract in nature (Lambon Ralph & Patterson, 2008; 
Patterson et al., 2007) or, at least in part, built from sensory/motor features that are nevertheless 
accessible from different types of inputs (Martin, 2007). Given that we find a distributed network 
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of brain regions in which cross-decoding is successful, our results are more consistent with 
models that posit that semantic representations arise from activity in a network of brain areas, as 
opposed to within a single (localized) hub. Moreover, given that some of the areas that show 
cross-decoding (such as the parahippocampal gyrus) are also generally taken to be part of 
sensory/motor processing networks, our results are consistent with accounts wherein perceptual 
representations form part of the semantic representation of concepts and are represented in the 
relevant perceptual system, using a common code in each.  
 
Overall, then, the pattern of decoding results suggests that the processing of meaningful stimuli 
unfolds across a large-scale, distributed brain network, encompassing both sensory as well as 
cognitive processing regions (Figure 2.2).  Parts of this network share a common code, while 
other regions perform analyses that provide high-level (i.e., categorical) information about 
specific input types.  Moreover, it seems likely that the temporally-summed activity we measure 
here in fMRI reflects dynamic processing patterns that transition over time and brain area from 
modality- and input- specific processing to processing that is shared across input types (e.g., for a 
review see Federmeier et al., (2015)). 
 
2.4.3 What is the nature of the representation in regions of cross-decoding? 
Although our results show representational similarity across pictures and words for natural scene 
categories in multiple regions, we do not know the exact the nature of this representation. What 
is being decoded in these regions? Is it visual information, semantic information, or both? One 
possible view is that, as scenes and the words that describe them bear no visual resemblance to 
one another, any similarity of representation cannot be visual in nature and hence must be an 
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abstract, semantic representation evoked from a common concept (Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013). 
However, such a view overlooks the possibility that the semantics evoked by a word may 
integrally include visual perceptual representations that are stored in a visual feature space (Kan 
et al., 2003; Martin, 2007; Binder et al., 2005). 
 
Considerations of visual imagery are particularly pertinent in visual processing regions. Indeed, 
visual imagery is known to evoke activity in the precuneus, the left angular gyrus, the 
supramarginal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule (Ganis et al., 2004) – regions that show not 
only cross-decoding, but also straight-decoding for pictures and words in our study -- as well as 
posterior ventral visual cortex (e.g. O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000), which also shows cross-
decoding in our study. However, this imagery explanation does not need to be seen as an 
alternative to a semantic representation. An embodied view of cognition holds that the semantics 
of a concrete concept is distributed across both sensory and motor systems, which are then 
essential for the processing of semantic information (Martin, 2007; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 
2010). If every time someone reads the word “beach,” for instance, his/her parahippocampal 
gyrus represents a beach or beach-like stimulus, then it is difficult to argue that this activity is not 
part of his/her concept of a beach.  In other words, the activation of a visual representation, either 
through explicit imagery (D'Esposito et al., 1997) or while performing a semantic task (Kan et 
al., 2003), may be an essential part of semantics, at least for concrete (imageable) concepts. In 
the future, more work will be needed to understand how each of the regions in our cross-
decoding network contributes to both our visual and semantic representations. It may be that the 
dichotomy that is sometimes assumed between semantic and visual information is at least partly 
artificial. 
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In summary, we have shown cross-decoding across picture and word input types for the natural 
scene categories of beaches, cities, highways and mountains. These stimuli, all constituting 
outdoor scene categories, evoke activity in similar brain regions.  Thus, successful cross-
decoding here implies a common representation at a high spatial resolution (i.e. the pattern is 
similar even within circumscribed brain regions). Although questions remain about the exact 
nature of the representation in each area, this commonality thus provides the strongest evidence 
to date of a common code. 
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2.6 Table 
Table 2.1. Location of various clusters from the cross-decoding map. The decoding accuracy at 
the peak location along with the co-ordinates are listed. We have added a suffix to distinguish 
two nearby clusters in the r-Middle Frontal Gyrus, the l-Middle Frontal Gyrus, and the l-Inferior 
Frontal Gyrus. 
Clusters 
Number 
of 
Voxels 
Accurac
y Peak x Peak y Peak z 
Precuneus, Angular Gyrus, 
RSC, IPL and SPL 11363 30.22 -28 -70 46 
r-Middle Frontal Gyrus 1 458 29.97 26 6 64 
r-Middle Frontal Gyrus 2 172 28.53 24 32 44 
l-Middle Frontal Gyrus 1 124 28.53 -34 54 14 
l-Inferior Frontal Gyrus 1 124 28.36 -36 34 12 
l-Inferior Frontal Gyrus 2 73 28.32 -50 10 22 
l-Middle Frontal Gyrus 2 56 28.62 -30 2 64 
l-Paracentral Lobule 22 28.53 -8 -42 68 
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2.6 Figures 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Stimuli were presented in separate picture (A) and word (B) runs. Presentations were 
blocked by category for both the picture and word runs. We used sixty-four unique stimuli in 
each of the four categories: beaches, mountains, cities and highways. Each image was presented 
for one second with an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of one second. For the words, each stimulus 
consisted of two word  phrases with each word being presented for 400 ms, with a fixation 
screen shown between words for 200 ms. Thus the total time for the word trial was also one 
second, equal to the time the pictures were shown. A one second fixation screen was shown at 
the end of the second word. Each block consisted of four trials for the picture and word runs. 
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Figure 2.2 Maps showing the mean percentage of cross-decoding accuracy from pictures to 
words (train on picture runs and test on a word run) and from words to pictures (train on word 
runs and test on a picture run). The threshold for the maps have been set to an accuracy 27.75% 
(p < 0.05). The top row shows views from the left hemisphere and the bottom row shows views 
from the right hemisphere. 
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Figure 2.3. A: Straight decoding accuracy of pictures (train on picture runs and test on a left out 
picture run). The top row shows views from the left hemisphere and the bottom row shows views 
from the right hemisphere. B: Straight decoding accuracy of words (train on word runs and test 
on a left out word run). We see above chance straight-decoding for words only in the left 
hemisphere. 
 
 
LH	
RH	
LH	
	 38	
 
 
Chapter 3 
The Good Bad Effect: How Does Representativeness Inform Vision?  
 
3.1. Introduction 
As a first step in understanding the nature of interactions between semantics and vision, we 
showed that there are similar representations across pictures and words pertaining to natural 
scenes, distributed across multiple brain regions, including higher visual areas and putative 
semantic brain regions (Chapter 2; Kumar et al., (in press)). Certainly, the early sensory areas, 
where we observed straight-decoding but not cross-decoding, seem to strongly represent 
modality specific information. Our cross-decoding results indicate that the higher associative 
areas, for example the PPA (an area known to process scene layout) and the RSC can activate 
representations across modalities. How do these modality specific features in early sensory areas 
and representations activated semantically in higher cortical regions interact when humans 
process natural scene images? When in the processing of natural scenes do we see an influence 
of prior knowledge or semantics?  
 
One way to answer these questions is to compare scenes that make better contact with our prior 
knowledge, and hence have rich semantic associations, versus those that are less representative 
of their category. Representativeness of a scene image encompasses a wide array of visual 
properties that humans have learned about that category of scenes. By studying the processing of 
representative scenes (herein called good) as compared to non-representative scenes (herein 
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called bad), we can gain insights into when in the processing stream our prior knowledge about 
representativeness impacts visual processing  
 
Good and bad exemplars of natural scenes have been studied using behavioral measures and 
fMRI (Caddigan et al., 2010; 2017; Torralbo et al., 2013). In a recent behavioral study (Caddigan 
et al., 2010; 2017), it was shown that subjects detect briefly presented good exemplars of natural 
scenes better than bad exemplars; that is, they can more quickly state that an image as opposed to 
noise was present when that image was a good exemplar of the category. Given that humans are 
good at extracting the gist of a scene, even at very fast presentation rates (Walther et al., 2009) 
and there is no gist in an image created with noise, we would not expect that detecting an intact 
scene from noise would depend on how representative the image is. Surprisingly, the 
representativeness of the scene matters. This result is a novel finding as prior work on 
categorization and detection does not inform us about the dependency of detection on 
categorization. We know that people are more accurate in categorizing good exemplars as 
compared to bad exemplars of objects (Rosch, Simpson, Miller, 1976). A study on detection and 
categorization of objects (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005) showed similar reaction times for 
categorization and detection, leading to the inference that categorization and detection occur in 
parallel. The better detection of good exemplars of natural scenes (Caddigan et al., 2010; 2017), 
thus extends the earlier work on categorization and detection, showing that even in a pure 
detection task, representativeness to a known category matters. We can think of good exemplars 
of a scene as being at the center of a multi-dimensional space that specifies the category, and 
hence evoke strong representations of the category. In the intact image versus noise detection 
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task (Caddigan et al., 2010; 2017), explicit categorization is not necessary and yet the degree to 
which the scene represents its category impacts perception.  
 
Since our concept of a good beach, for example, must be learned, such an effect suggests that 
experience informs our vision. How is it that experience can have an effect on processing stimuli 
that are presented for just 10s of milliseconds and backward masked? Backward masking 
reduces the visibility of the target stimulus (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000) by disrupting the  
ongoing processing of the stimulus with a mask that closely follows it in time. Nonetheless, 
subjects not only are able to perceive natural scenes even with very brief presentations (Walther 
et al., 2009; Li et al., 2002; Rousselet et al. 2002; Thorpe et al., 1996), they can perceive them 
with even less viewing time if they are good (as opposed to bad) exemplars of their category 
(Caddigan et al., 2010; 2017). There are both feedforward and feedback explanations of how 
representativeness impacts rapid perception. For example, exposure to natural scenes over one’s 
lifetime may change visual cortex to enable quick feedforward processing of scenes and objects 
(Rousselet et al, 2005; Thorpe et al., 1996 ); that is, the superior performance on good exemplars 
does not initially rely on any semantic processing but arises through more efficient bottom-up 
processing of the visual features present. The other possibility is that even with incomplete 
perceptual processing, semantics/knowledge about scenes becomes active and feeds back into 
visual processing (Malcolm et al., 2014; Koivisto et al., 2011; Bar et al., 2007; Kveraga et al., 
2007), making it easier/more robust. Our prior work (Kumar et al., in press; Chapter 2) is 
consistent with this possibility, given that we have shown that shared representations between 
verbal semantics and visual features exist in higher visual areas (albeit at much slower time-
scales).  
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Prior work using fMRI (Torralbo et al., 2013) shows a range of possibilities at which good and 
bad exemplars can start to differ in their processing: they may differ in low level visual features, 
larger scale spatial layouts, or even at the semantic level. MVPA on data collected when 
participants viewed good and bad exemplars showed differences in decoding scene category 
between good and bad exemplars in brain regions spanning many different levels of analysis. For 
good exemplars, scene category could be decoded above chance in V1 as well as the PPA and 
RSC (Torralbo et al., 2013). Importantly, the decoding accuracy for good exemplars of the scene 
category was always higher than for bad exemplars of the scene category in all these regions. 
The decoding differences between good and bad exemplars in V1 imply that there could be 
differences at small spatial scales between good and bad exemplars. The decoding differences in 
the PPA and RSC imply that there could be differences between good and bad exemplars at 
larger spatials scales, as the PPA is known to process large spatial layouts (Epstein and 
Kanwisher, 1998). fMRI, lacking temporally specificity, also does not inform us about the time 
course of processing differences between good and bad exemplars. Thus, the fMRI results 
provide us a framework of possibilities that could contribute to the onset of differences between 
processing good versus bad exemplars, but the details pertaining to cognitive mechanisms and 
the time course of processing are lacking. Thus, we turn to ERPs to determine what cognitive 
mechanisms are responsible for differences in processing good and bad exemplars, and at what 
timescales do these processes differ. 
 
Using ERPs we can distinguish between these possibilities based on the time-window in which 
differences in processing between good and bad exemplars are first observed. ERPs are a direct 
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and instantaneous measure of the continuous electrical activity in the brain (Münte, Urbach, 
Düzel, & Kutas, 2000; Luck and Kappenman, 2011) and can provide insights into the timeline 
and cognitive mechanisms underlying good and bad scene processing. Importantly, ERP signals 
are linked to cognitive processes spanning attention, perception, semantics, long-term memory 
and decision making (see overview Münte, Urbach, Düzel, & Kutas, 2000).  
 
For example, if good and bad exemplar processing differed due to low level visual features, we 
would predict effects on sensory components such as the P1 and N1 in the time-window 100-150 
ms (Schechter et al., 2005). If the differences between processing good and bad exemplars were 
due to differences in the semantics evoked, we would see differences on the N400 component in 
the timeframe of 350-600 ms (Federmeier and Kutas, 2001). If differences between good and bad 
exemplars are due to a judgment and decision making stage we would see differences in the late 
positive complex (LPC) component after about 500 ms (Finnigan, Humphreys, Dennis, & 
Geffen, 2002). If differences between good and bad exemplars arise due to the interaction of 
prior knowledge and visual processing (Caddigan et al., 2010; 2017), it is plausible that we will 
see those differences in the N300 component (Schendan and Kutas, 2002) which indexes higher 
level perceptual processing in time-window 200-350 ms, since this is a time-frame in which both 
semantics (350-600ms) and high level perceptual processing could be active (200-350).  
 
We used good and bad exemplars from six natural scene categories: beaches, forests, mountains, 
city streets, highways, and offices to examine the cognitive and perceptual processes underlying 
differences between good and bad exemplars. We measured ERPs to understand the mechanisms 
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that lead to differences between processing good versus bad exemplars and the time when these 
differences occur. 
   
3.2 Methods 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
Twenty right-handed neuro-typical college-age subjects (mean age = 23.9 years, range = 18 to 33 
years) participated in the study. Participants signed an informed consent and were compensated 
for their participation in the study, through course credit or monetary compensation. The study 
was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. All participants were right-handed, as assessed by the Edinburgh Inventory 
(Oldfield, 1971). Participants also had no history of neurological disease, psychiatric disorders, 
or brain damage. 
 
3.2.2 Visual Stimuli 
We choose pictures of natural scenes in six categories: beaches, forests, mountains, city streets, 
highways and offices. These images were collected from the internet and rated for 
representativeness to category on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and the top rated 60 images were 
marked as good exemplars for each category, and the lowest rated 60 images were marked as bad 
exemplars for each category (for details on the choice of good and bad exemplars see Methods in 
(Torralbo et al., 2013). Using an image processing software (Imagemagic, 
http://imagemagick.org/script/index.php), these images were resized to 340 x 255 pixels and 
placed on a black background with a fixation cross placed at the center. The images were 
randomly presented, for each trial, at one of three locations: the center, placed 2 degrees to the 
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left of fixation, or 2 degrees to right of fixation, with a total of 120 good images and 120 bad 
images presented at each location. In total 360 good images and 360 bad images were presented 
across the three locations. In this work, we only report results from the images that were 
centrally placed. The results for the lateralized images will be reported as a part of a study on 
hemispheric differences in the future. 
 
3.2.3 Presentation 
Subjects were instructed at the beginning of the study that they would be seeing good and bad 
exemplars of six scene categories and that their task at the end of each trial was to indicate via 
button press whether the image was a good or a bad exemplar its category. They were given a 
few practice trials to get them accustomed to the task. They were seated at a distance of 100 cm 
from the screen, and the images subtended a visual angle of 7.65° x 5.73° (width x height). 
Subjects were instructed to fixate on a central cross. They were told to remain relaxed throughout 
the experiment and that they could blink their eyes once the trial was complete, before they hit 
the response button. Responding would start the next trial. Each trial began with a fixation cross 
presented on a blank screen for a duration jittered (to prevent any expectancy effects) between 
1000-2000 seconds (Figure 3.1). This was followed by the presentation of an image, either a 
good exemplar or a bad exemplar from one of the six categories, for a duration of 200 ms.  This 
was followed by a fixation cross on a blank screen for 500 ms. At the end of the trial a prompt 
with "Good or Bad?" was displayed on the screen and subjects used a button press to indicate 
their judgment. The experiment lasted for approximately one hour and fifteen minutes. Subjects 
were given two five minute breaks at roughly 25 minutes and 60 minutes from the start of the 
experiment. 
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3.2.4 ERP Setup and Analysis 
We used 26 channels of passive electrodes that were equidistantly arranged on the scalp using an 
electrode cap. In addition, we used 3 electrodes on the face to measure eye movements and 
blinks. Impedances were kept below 5 KΩ for scalp channels and 10 KΩ for eye channels. 
Horizontal eye movements were tracked by computing the difference between signals extracted 
from electrodes placed on the outer canthus of the left and right eye. Eye blinks were tracked by 
placing one electrode below the left eye. The signal was bandpass filtered online (0.02 Hz - 100 
Hz) and sampled at the rate of 250 Hz. The EEG signals were converted into voltage from their 
analog to digital (A/D) values by independently calibrating the A/D units of the amplifier with 
preset voltages. Artifact rejection was performed before averaging the signal to remove 
excessive eye movements, drift, and blinks, using thresholds calibrated for individual subjects A 
blink correction algorithm (Dale, 1994) was used on all subjects to recover signals due to blink 
correction.  The EEG signals were re-referenced offline to the mean of the left and right 
mastoids. ERPs were calculated for a time period spanning 100 ms before stimulus onset to 920 
ms after stimulus onset, with the 100 ms prestimulus interval used as the baseline.  This 
processed signal was then averaged for each condition across all subjects. A digital bandpass 
filter (0.2 Hz - 30 Hz) was applied before measurements were taken from the ERPs.  
 
We computed the grand average ERP waveforms for good and bad conditions across all subjects. 
For the two conditions, the mean amplitude was computed at frontal electrode sites and t-tests 
and bayes factors were computed. We also computed the grand average ERP waveforms for 
natural (beaches, forests, and mountains) and man-made (city streets, highways, and offices) 
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categories. We computed statistics using R (R Core Team, 2014). Specifically, we used the 
functions t.test, to compute t-tests, and ttestbf (from the package: BayesFactor) to compute Bayes 
Factors. For within-subject calculations of confidence intervals, we used the function 
summarySEwithin() that is based on Morey (2008). 
3.3 Results 
 
The grand-averaged mean ERP signal for each condition is shown at 8 electrode sites in Figure 
3.2A. This figure shows that the good and bad exemplars appear to be differentiated beginning 
around 250 ms from stimulus onset, with greater negativity for bad exemplars than for good 
exemplars.  The timing, polarity, and scalp distribution is consistent with the N300 (McPherson 
& Holcomb, 1999; Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 2007). To measure this N300 response, 
which is known from prior literature to be frontally distributed (REFs), we computed mean 
amplitudes for good and bad exemplars from the 11 frontal electrode sites.  As shown in Table 
3.1 and Figure 3.2B, this analysis revealed that bad exemplars elicit significantly larger (more 
negative) N300 responses than do good exemplars.  
 
We also see differences between good and bad exemplars in a 500-800ms time window at 
parietal sites, with greater positivity for good exemplars than bad exemplars F(1,19) =12.61, 
p=0.0021, epsilon = 0.0845 (Greenhouse-Geiser). The ERP waveforms in this window show the 
form typically described for the Late Positive Component (LPC), which has been associated with 
confidence in decision making (Finnigan, Humphreys, Dennis, & Geffen, 2002).  This effect 
suggests that subjects had greater confidence in judging the good exemplars as good, as opposed 
to the bad exemplars as bad. Indeed, subjects were better at identifying good exemplars 
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(accuracy: Mean =85.83%, std. dev = 14.17%) as compared to bad exemplars (accuracy: Mean 
=55.83%, std. dev =15.83%). 
 
As a point of reference to prior work, we also examined the differences in ERP waveforms 
between natural and man-made scene categories. In categorization studies, the natural vs man-
made is an easy distinction to be made on the basis of features (Oliva & Torralba, 2001), and is 
made before basic-level categorization (Loschky & Larso, 2010) and thus is a good candidate for 
differing in low-level processing. Indeed, we do find that the ERP waveforms begin to differ for 
natural scene categories as compared to man-made scene categories approximately 150 ms from 
stimulus onset (Figure 3.3). This is interesting because it suggests the good/bad distinction is 
more complex than the natural/man-made distinction since good/bad distinction comes 
considerably later. 
 
Table 3.1. The grand average mean values, in the N300 time-window (250-350 ms), shown for 
11 frontal electrode sites (see Figure 3.2B) along with t-test and Bayes factor values. The N300 
for bad exemplars have a greater mean negative amplitude than for the good exemplars. The t-
test and Bayes factor calculations compared the Good/Bad difference to 0.   
       
Condition N Mean  
(micro 
Volts) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(micro 
Volts) 
t(19) p Bayes 
Factor  
 
Bad 20 -6.4 0.7 -5.35 3.64E-05 686.7 Good 20 -5.3 0.7 
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3.4 Discussion 
We set out to answer one question: What are the mechanisms that the human brain uses to 
differentiate between good and bad exemplars of natural scene images.  Thus, we used ERPs, 
from which we can not only get timing information but also gain insights into the perceptual and 
cognitive processes that help distinguish good and bad exemplars. We found that the ERP 
waveforms for good and bad exemplars differ in processing in the time-window of 250-350 ms. 
These waveforms show a greater negativity for bad exemplars than for good exemplars and this 
effect is distributed across frontal electrode sites. Given the time window of the difference 
between the ERPs for good and bad exemplars in our experiment, and their frontal distribution, 
we characterize these waveforms as reflecting the N300 component, which has been 
characterized in other work using images of objects (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 2007) and 
scenes (Pietrowsky et al., 1996; Vo and Wolfe, 2013).  
 
The N300 has been shown to index the degree of structure and regularity in pictorial stimuli. In a 
study with pictures of objects at different levels of fragmentation (ranging from a fuzzy 
collection of line segments to an arrangement of line segments where the object outline is very 
clear), the ERPs in the time window of 200-350 ms showed greater negativity, over frontal sites, 
when subjects were unable to identify the object segments as compared to when they did 
recognize the object (Schendan and Kutas, 2002). The N300 is not sensitive to local differences 
in contours: when low level properties (e.g. color of the line segments) are changed, there is no 
difference in the N300 time window for the original and changed versions of the stimuli 
(Schendan and Kutas, 2007). The N300 is also sensitive to well learned viewpoints of objects. 
Non-canonical views (e.g. An umbrella held horizontally) elicit a greater frontal negativity as 
compared to a canonical view (e.g. An umbrella held vertically) (Schendan and Kutas, 2003). 
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Similarly, in a study using natural scenes, the ERPs were more negative in the N300 time 
window when the scene was scrambled (created by recombining parts of the scene image into a 
random jigsaw) as compared to when the landscape scene was intact and identified (Pietrowsky 
et al., 1996). This negativity in the N300 time-window was also seen in a study with natural 
scene images that contained elements not in their probable locations (e.g. A cup placed on top of 
a microwave door) as compared to a picture of scene where all elements were in predictable 
places (e.g. A cup placed inside a microwave) (Vo and Wolfe, 2013).  Thus, the N300 
component helps distinguish across a variety of perceptual contexts that do not just differ in low 
level attributes but encompass global structure, canonical viewpoints, probable views of scenes, 
and in our own experiment, the representativeness of the stimuli. 
 
We would like to collectively refer to these properties -- canonical viewpoints, probable views 
and representativeness – as learned statistical regularities of the stimuli. It is this collection of 
statistical regularities, which we can also call a template, that can help us in rapid categorization 
and identification of stimuli.  Thus, we can think of the differences in N300 component as an 
indicator of the degree to which the exemplars match a template, with greater negativity for a 
stimulus when it doesn't match a template as compared to when it does match a template. 
 
These templates play an important role in object and scene recognition. An object recognition 
model has been proposed, based on a series of experiments characterizing the N300, to occur in 
multiple stages for familiar and unfamiliar items (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 2007). In the 
first stage, indexed by the P150-N170 components, perceptual grouping processes are at work. 
This stage constructs the whole from parts and helps identify easily separable objects (faces vs. 
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non-faces) or even indicates an early match to a canonical viewpont. In the next stage, called the 
object selection stage, indexed by the N300, objects are matched to items in memory with similar 
perceptual structures. This stage is viewpoint centric, as indexed by the N300, and reflects the 
processing of the global structure of the object. Thus, at this stage, canonical views and 
previously seen objects are identified (lower N300 amplitude). If sufficient information is 
available to identify non-canonical items, they can be identified at this stage too, indexed by a 
larger N300 amplitude, as compared to the canonical views. This stage involves recurrent and 
feedback processing (David, Harrison, & Friston, 2005; Schendan and Kutas, 2007) and results 
in object selection for canonical and identifiable objects. The N300 stage of processing has also 
been proposed as a pruning stage, where representations matched to perceptual structure in 
memory are kept and all other representatons pruned out from selection (Pietrowsky et al., 1996). 
For stimuli that have no identifiable information (non-recoverable), object selection is not made 
at this stage, and no modulations are seen in the N300 amplitude. For these non-recoverable  
stimuli, a later stage identification process manifests after 500 ms, indexed by the LPC. At this 
stage, identified objects, and hence matched to long-term memory, show a greater positivity as 
compared to unidentifiable objects. This LPC stage is also where fine distinctions, at local scales 
(e.g. positions of small edge segments), are made between objects (Schendan and Kutas, 2007). 
 
Our work extends this understanding of the N300 and the cognitive and physiological processes 
that it indexes, as there are some notable differences between our bad exemplars and the stimuli 
used in all the previous work characterizing the N300 component. Our bad exemplars are not 
impoverished images of isolated objects, unlike the fragmented stimuli used in prior studies, nor 
do they have any artificially displaced elements in them. Rather, they are full color photographs 
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of natural scenes that don’t match our expectations about representative views of the category. In 
the object model (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 2007), objects were matched to known or 
canonical viewpoints and showed a lower N300 as compared to objects that had non-canonical 
viewpoints. The mismatch to regularities, or templates, is the key insight that we can transfer to 
the interpretation of our study from prior studies on N300 differences. Good exemplars match a 
learned template better, and hence show a lower N300 amplitude, as compared to bad exemplars.   
 
We can also draw parallels between the object identification models (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 
2003; 2007). and scene categorization models (Oliva and Torralba, 2001). Natural scene 
categorization can be achieved at low spatial resolution, that is without any identifying 
information about objects in the scene (Oliva & Schyns, 1995). One model, the Spatial Envelope 
model, posits the use of these spectral signatures in extracting the gist of a scene (Oliva and 
Torralba, 2001). Gist extraction is from the global image (Greene & Oliva, 2009) and hence fits 
the time-window of the N300, based on the object studies (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 
2007). The templates we propose, constituting learned statistical regularities, can serve to select 
and match gist in a perceptual structure system, with images that find a template match are 
facilitated and identified in the N300 time-window. In our case, all our images are complete, as 
in not fragmented or non-recoverable. Hence, most of the processing and identification can 
happen at the N300 stage, similar to the object model (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 2007). 
Scene processing is known to occur in extrastriate visual areas in the PPA and RSC (Epstein and 
Kanwisher, 1998) corresponding well with the N300 localization in higher visual areas 
(Schendan and Kutas, 2002). Similarly, recurrent and feedback processing, as in the object 
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model (David, Harrison, & Friston, 2005; Schendan and Kutas, 2007), do play a role in scene 
processing (Malcolm et al., 2014; Serre et al., 2007).  
 
We have thus gained new insights into how our prior knowledge, stored as templates, of natural 
scenes, is used in scene processing. In the next chapter, we focus on examining the dynamics of 
processing good and bad exemplars of natural scenes under conditions in which participants are 
precued, and hence can pre-activate features relevant to the incoming stimuli category template. 
This will help address the question: Is a good exemplar always facilitated in processing or does 
what we expect modulate the processing of good exemplars. 
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3.5 Figures 
 
Figure 3.1. Schematic of one trial in the experiment. A screen with a fixation cross is shown for 
time-period randomized between 1000-2000 ms. A good or bad exemplar image from one of the 
six categories is presented at one of the following locations: the center, the right visual field or 
the left visual field, followed by a fixation cross. The subjects then make a delayed response to 
the question "Good or Bad?" and the next trial begins. 
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Figure 3.2A 
 
B.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
µ	
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Figure 3.2 A (contd.): The grand average ERP waveforms for good (blue) and bad (maroon) 
exemplars shown at 8 electrode sites. Negative voltage is plotted upwards. The channel locations 
are marked in yellow on the schematic of the scalp. The waveforms differ in the N300 time-
window (250-350 ms), with greater negativity for bad exemplars as compared to good 
exemplars, over frontal sites. B: The mean of the ERP amplitude over 11 frontal electrode sites 
(N = 20). The error bars plotted are within-subject confidence intervals.  
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Figure 3.3. The grand average ERP waveforms plotted for natural and man-made scenes for 
good and bad exemplars. The natural vs. man-made distinction is seen separating in an earlier 
time-window, approximately 150-200 ms after stimulus onset in all fronto-central channels, as 
compared to the separation for good versus bad exemplars. The grey box indicates the time-
window of the separation between the natural and man-made categories, for both good and bad 
exemplars, showing that is earlier than the time-point for the good versus bad distinction. 
 
 
 
 
 
	 57	
 
Chapter 4 
Expectancy Modulates the Good-Bad Effect 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
I have showed, so far (Chapter 3), that the difference in processing between good and bad 
exemplars occurs in a time-window of 250-350 ms, with the bad exemplars showing a greater 
negativity in the ERP waveform over frontal electrode sites. I linked this processing to the ERP 
N300 component that indexes global structure, canonical viewpoints, and – now – 
representativeness to category. I collectively refer to these properties as learned statistical 
regularities, or “templates” for short. I hypothesized that good exemplars are facilitated in their 
processing because they better match a template for the category as compared to bad exemplars. 
In this chapter, then, I focus on the dynamics with which those templates are called to mind and 
used. Specifically, I ask what happens to the visual processing of incoming good and bad 
exemplars of a category if people dynamically modulate their expectations about stimulus 
category through the use of a prior, verbal cue. Does this dynamic activation of semantics, via 
reading a word cue, influence picture processing in the N300 time-window (or earlier) and thus 
modulate how statistical regularities are accessed and used during visual processing. The answer 
to this question will give us insights into the dynamics of the interaction between semantic and 
visual processing.  
 
Building on the design from Chapter 3, in this experiment we set up an expectation for a 
particular scene category and then present either a good or bad exemplar of the cued scene 
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category or a good or bad exemplar of a mismatching scene category.  A number of prior studies 
have examined basic semantic match/mismatch effects ; (see review Kutas and Federmeier, 
2011), including from verbal cues to images, allowing clear predictions about the type of effects 
that should be seen in later processing windows.  In particular, semantic mismatch effects (e.g. 
reading the word “Forest” followed by a picture of a beach) would be expected to modulate the 
amplitude of the N400 component. The timing of the N400 for a stimulus (words, sentences, 
pictures, sounds, gestures) is stable, seen between about 300 and 500 ms, peaking at around 400 
ms (Kutas and Hillyard, 1980; see review Kutas and Federmeier, 2011). The N400 component is 
distributed over central-parietal sites for words and fronto-central sites for colored pictures. This 
is true not only for written sentences but also for prime-target word pairs (e.g. congruent: farm-
ranch; incongruent: hook-table), with the largest N400 amplitude seen for target words that are 
outside of the category of the first word (Kutas, 1993). This prime-target paradigm is what we 
are using in our current study, except the target is a picture of a natural scene. Given prior work, 
we expect the N400 pattern to be similar for pictures. A similar pattern of N400 results was 
obtained for written sentences with the last words sometimes replaced with a picture (Federmeier 
and Kutas, 2001; Nigam et al., 1992);  for spoken sentences with pictures (congruent or 
incongruent) simultaneously displayed when the critical noun (congruent or incongruent) 
(Willems, Özyürek, & Hagoort, 2008); for line drawings (Holcomb & Mcpherson, 1994); for 
colored pictures (Mcpherson & Holcomb, 1999); and for video clips (Sitnikova, Holcomb, 
Kiyonaga, & Kuperberg, 2008). Thus, in our experiment, if the scene stimulus (e.g. picture of a 
beach) matches the verbal cue category (e.g. Beach) we expect to see reductions in the N400 
amplitude to the match as opposed to when the stimulus (e.g. picture of a forest) does not match 
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the verbal cue (e.g. Mountain) and hence are not in the semantic neighborhood of the cue, 
leading to large N400 amplitudes.  
 
What is less clear from the extant literature is what the impact of good versus bad might be on 
the N400 pattern.  If what makes a scene good (e.g. a good beach) is that it is better at evoking 
stored semantic associations for the category (e.g. beach), we expect to see the strongest N400 
effects for good exemplars, with robust reductions in N400 amplitude to good exemplars that 
match the cue (e.g. Beach) versus good exemplars that do not match the cue (e.g. Mountain) and 
hence are not in the semantic neighborhood of the cue.  On this view, we might expect an 
intermediate response to matching bad exemplars, which share some of the category’s features 
but not as many as the matching good exemplars.  Mismatching bad exemplars are an interesting 
case.  If they share no features with the cue, then N400 amplitudes to mismatching items should 
be insensitive to the good/bad dimension – that is, both conditions should be at the baseline 
(large N400), unprimed level.  However, if part of what make bad exemplars bad is that they 
share some semantic features with other scene categories, then N400 responses to this condition 
might be facilitated relative to the good mismatches. 
 
Of greatest interest for the present study, however, is the effect on the N300.  If the N300 reflects 
a point in processing in which knowledge-based information interacts with vision, it should be 
possible to dynamically influence the process by setting up knowledge-based expectations? By 
setting up an expectation, we are plausibly activating a template of statistical regularities of the 
category that is expected. That, in turn, may modulate the good/bad effect since, e.g., an 
incoming stimulus that is a good exemplar of beaches would still be a poor match for an 
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activated template for forests. Prior work and our own results indicated that the N300 time-
window is when object selection and matching (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 2007), pruning 
(Pietrowsky et al., 1996), or matching to templates occurs (Chapter 3). Thus, we are asking 
whether the matching process is sensitive to an active template, initiated from a different input 
type (written word). If the N300 component is sensitive to the active template, set up before the 
stimulus, then the arriving beach stimulus is not a match and we should see a larger N300 for the 
good exemplar of a beach as compared to when the cue (e.g. beach) and the incoming stimulus 
match (e.g. picture of a good beach) -- that is an unexpected good exemplar is processed 
similarly to a bad exemplar (i.e. a less good match to the active template) in the N300 time 
window. If the N300 component is indexing templates activated only by the incoming stimulus 
and cannot be modulated by any preexisting activations, we should see similar facilitation for 
good exemplars regardless of whether it is preceded by a matched or mismatched cue.  
 
In this work I use a precue to assess the dynamics of top-down semantic influences on the visual 
processing of natural scenes. Similar to the previous experiment (Chapter 3), I presented images 
of good and bad exemplars from the same six categories, but with one change:  I cued 
participants with a noun describing the category before the start of the trial, thus setting up their 
expectation of what they would see. For seventy five percent of the trials, the cue matched the 
stimulus, constituting either a good or a bad exemplar from the cued category, but for twenty five 
percent of the trials, there was a mismatch between the cue and the image (Figure 4.1) (See 
Methods 4.2 for more details). 
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4.2 Methods 
The methods were almost identical to those in the previous chapter (see Methods Section 3.2), 
with the following differences: 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
A different set of twenty-four subjects participated in this experiment. We had to drop four 
subjects in total due to excessive eye-movements and noise (3 subjects), and problems with data 
recording for one subject. (mean age = 23.9 years, range = 18 to 33 years). Participants signed an 
informed consent and were compensated for their participation in the study, through monetary 
compensation. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. All participants were right-handed, as assessed by the Edinburgh 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Participants also had no history of neurological disease, psychiatric 
disorders, or brain damage. 
 
4.2.2 Presentation 
The trials began with a word cue, presented for 500 ms (Figure 4.1). The cue consisted of a 
category cue from one of the following words: Beach, City Street, Forest, Highway, Mountain, 
and Office. For each category, we ensured that five trials were mismatched, for good and bad 
exemplars. We thus had 75% matched trials and 25% mismatched trials. At the end of each trial, 
participants were shown a question,“Yes or No?” Participants had to make a delayed button 
response and indicate if the picture matched the cue or not. The responses for “Yes” and “No” 
were counterbalanced to the left and right hand across subjects. 
 
4.2.3 ERP Setup and Analysis 
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All processing of the waveforms was identical to the processing in Chapter 3 (Methods Section 
3.4). We computed the grand averaged signal across all subjects for the following conditions: 
Good Match, Good Mismatch, Bad Match and Bad Mismatch. Again, we only present data for 
the central presentation trials in this chapter. We also chose appropriate time-windows for 
analysis based on the mix of components observed in our study. The N400 analysis (350-500 ms) 
was added to the results of this study.  
4.3 Results 
The timing, polarity and scalp distributions of the effects in our experiment are consistent with 
N300 component (McPherson & Holcomb, 1999; Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 2007). We 
report the ERP amplitude in the N300 and N400 time-windows for good and bad exemplars 
under the two cueing conditions: Match and Mismatch.  
 
N300: A sample set of ERP waveforms at eight channel locations are plotted in Figure 4.2.A. 
We replicate the N300 effect of the previous experiment for the good and bad exemplars, with a 
frontally distributed negativity for the bad exemplars that is greater than that for good exemplars. 
Because the N300 effect is frontal, we compute the mean for the four conditions, taking the 
average across 11 frontal channels (Figure 4.2.B, Table 4.1). This again shows that we replicate 
the difference between good and bad exemplars in the N300 amplitude for the match condition 
over frontal sites. In the mismatch condition, we see a greater negativity for the good exemplars, 
as compared to the good exemplars in the match condition, consistent with the idea that the N300 
is indexing a match of the incoming stimulus to the template activated by the context. Moreover, 
there was no significant difference between the good and bad exemplars when a mismatch 
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occurs. This is seen in the individual waveforms across frontal electrode sites (Figure 4.2A) as 
well as in the mean amplitude across all frontal sites (Figure 4.2B, Table 4.1). 
 
Are the stimuli under conditions of representativeness and cueing processed by two separate 
neural sources and hence indexed by two separate ERP components or by common neural 
sources and indexed by a single component? There is a clear interaction of representativeness 
and cueing in the 11 frontal electrodes tests but this does not lead to an inference of separate 
neural generators. If there are any differences in scalp distribution of the ERP waveforms for 
these two conditions (representativeness and cueing) we can infer that the neural generators 
could be potentially different. To compare the scalp distribution of the main effects of 
representativeness and cueing, we computed source voltage distributions of difference waves for 
the two main effects: representativeness (Bad – Good) and cueing (Mismatch – Match) (Figure 
4.4). In the N300 time-window, the two main effects are qualitatively similar, with both effects 
frontally distributed. From this we infer that the representativeness of stimuli and their 
match/mismatch to verbal cues are being processed by common neural sources in the N300 time-
window. Quantitatively, the main effect of representativeness is larger as compared to the cueing 
effect in the N300 time-window.  
  
Table 4.1. The grand average mean values, in the N300 time-window (250-350 ms), shown for 
11 frontal electrode sites (see Figure 4.2B), along with t-test and Bayes factor values. There is 
strong evidence (large Bayes factor) for greater negativity of the N300 for bad exemplars as 
compared to good exemplars when the cue matches the stimulus. When there is a mismatch 
between the cue and the stimulus there is no evidence (small Bayes factor) for the difference 
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Table 4.1 (contd.). between good and exemplars in the N300 time-window. The t-test and Bayes 
factor calculations were performed as  𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝑎𝑑 − 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 	≠ 	0. 
Condition Cue N Mean  
(micro 
Volts) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(micro 
Volts) 
t(19) p Bayes 
Factor 
 
        
Bad Match 20 -7.1 0.9 
-7.04 1.07E-06 16914.8 Good Match 20 -5.1 1.1 
        
Bad Mismatch 20 -6.4 1.6 
-0.85 0.406 0.32 Good Mismatch 20 -6.0 1.4 
 
 
N400: The greater negativity in the waveform for the mismatched good exemplar as compared to 
the matched good exemplar continues beyond the N300 time-window into the N400 time-
window (Figure 4.2 A). In line with the interpretation of the N400 as indexing meaning and 
semantic expectancy, the good exemplars, when mismatched to the cue, show a greater 
negativity in the N400 time-window (350-500 ms) at frontal electrode sites, as compared to good 
exemplars that match the cue (Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2). The bad exemplars, in the match and 
mismatched condition, also show a greater negativity as compared to the good exemplars in the 
match condition in the N400 time-window. As the N400 distribution is fronto-central for colored 
pictures, we tested the frontal sites for an interaction of Good/Bad x Match/Mismatch using an 
ANOVA. The main effect (see Table 4.2 for mean values) of Good versus Bad is not significant: 
F(1,19) = 1.05, p = 0.32, epsilon (Greenhouse-Geisser) = 1). The main effect of cueing (Match 
versus Mismatch) is significant: F(1,19) = 6.09, p = 0.023, epsilon (Greenhouse-Geisser) = 1). 
The interaction of Good/Bad x Match/Mismatch is also significant and survives correction for 
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multiple comparisions: F(1,19) = 14.5, p = 0.0012, epsilon (Greenhouse-Geisser) = 1). We also 
performed pair-wise comparisons for different conditions (see Table 4.2.B). The conditions 
(Good Match – Good Mismatch), (Good Match – Bad Match) and (Good Match - Bad 
Mismatch) were significant. 
 
Similar to the computations of voltage scalp distributions for the N300 (Figure 4.4), we 
computed the scalp distributions of the effect of representativeness (Bad – Good) and cueing 
(Mismatch – Match) in the N400 time-window. In this time-window both effects are centro-
parietally distributed with a slight left laterality. This suggest that these factors are contributing 
to a common ERP component, the N400.  
 
Table 4.2.A. The grand average mean values, in the N400 time-window (350-500 ms), shown 
for 11 frontal electrode sites (see Figure 4.3). B. Pair-wise comparisons for different conditions 
in the N400 time-window. 
A 
Condition Cue N Mean  
(micro 
Volts) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(micro 
Volts) 
     
Good Match 20 -3.5 5.3 
Bad Match 20 -5.2 5.7 
Bad Mismatch 20 -4.7 6.7 
Good Mismatch 20 -5.7 6.7 
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Table 4.2 B (contd.). 
Test N t(19) p Bayes Factor 
     
Good Match – Good Mismatch 20 3.82 0.001162 32.1 
Good Match – Bad Match 20 5.06 6.966e-05 384.2 
Good Match - Bad Mismatch 20 1.81 0.01916 2.995 
Bad Match – Bad Mismatch 20 1.45 0.1647 0.57 
Bad Mismatch-Good Mismatch 
 
20 1.81 0.08692 0.91 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
Our goal in this study was to determine if semantics, via a verbal cue, can dynamically modulate 
visual processing. In our previous experiment (Chapter 3), participants only knew that one of six 
categories of good and bad exemplars of images will be viewed at each trial. We postulated that 
a template (a term we use to describe learned statistical regularities for a category) matching 
process is at work and that good exemplars were facilitated because they better matched a 
template.  In the current work, we set up expectations for a particular category on a particular 
trial using a verbal cue, with the aim of  pre-activating a particular template, and asked if this can 
modulate the good versus bad effect. The word cues have no perceptual similarity to the pictures, 
and, hence, any template that is pre-activated by the word cue must be via the semantics of the 
word. 
 
Our results provide evidence that semantics, via precuing, does indeed modulate visual 
processing. When the stimuli, both good and bad exemplars, match the expected template we see 
a difference between the good and bad exemplars in the N300 time-window, replicating the 
results from the previous experiment (Chapter 3) and prior work (Pietrowsky et al., 1996; 
Schendan and Kutas, 2002; Vo and Wolfe, 2013). When the stimuli do not match the expected 
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template, even when the exemplars are good exemplars (e.g. cue the word "Forest" and present 
an image of a good exemplar beach), we see a greater negativity for the good exemplars in the 
N300 time-window as compared to good exemplars in the match condition. That is, good 
exemplars are processed similar to bad exemplars, when they are unexpected, due to mismatch 
between the expected template and the incoming stimulus. Our results show that the good versus 
bad N300 difference is eliminated when there is a mismatch between the semantic cue and the 
image seen. Thus, the good versus bad effect is not driven by static templates activated only by 
the incoming stimulus, but by templates activated in the context of the experiment, in this case 
via a semantic cue.  In other words, the. good versus bad effect can be modulated with 
expectation -- an expectation initiated dynamically via a semantic cue describing the expected 
category. We note that the word cues have no perceptual similarity to the stimulus and hence the 
template must be semantically activated. Therefore, we can initiate category templates, via cues 
in a different modality (language), before viewing a stimulus and this template interacts with the 
incoming stimulus and change our processing of the stimulus within a time-window of 250-350 
ms after the stimulus onset. This provides strong evidence for the interaction of semantics and 
visual processing. 
 
This also aligns well with proposed models of the N300 being a time-window for higher-order 
visual processing with object selection and template matching (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 
2007). With semantic precuing, subjects had sufficient time to process the cue and instantiate a 
template for the expected category. This can possibly be initiated by tuning of multiple brain 
regions to the expected stimulus (Çukur, Nishimoto, Huth, & Gallant, 2013). All these results 
	 68	
taken together provide strong evidence for the interaction of semantics with the visual processing 
of natural scenes. 
 
The pattern of results for good and bad exemplars in the N400 time window is similar to what is 
seen in the N400 language literature (see review Kutas and Federmeier, 2011) for within- and 
outside of- category exemplars and we draw an analogy to this literature for our good and bad 
exemplars. The N400 indexes the structure of semantic memory (Federmeier and Kutas, 1999) 
with words that exactly match the expected word (e.g. in the context of sweeteners the word 
“sugar”) showing the lowest N400 amplitude, while words belonging to a category outside of the 
expected category (e.g. “dog”) showing the largest N400 amplitude. Words that are not the 
expected word but related to the expected word (e.g. “honey”) show an intermediate N400 
amplitude. Our results show that the good exemplars that match the cue show the lowest N400 
amplitude, indicating a match to the expected context. The other the conditions (good mismatch, 
bad mismatch and bad match) have larger N400 amplitudes, significantly different from the 
N400 amplitude for the good match exemplars. This indicates that the bad exemplars in the  
match condition and good and bad exemplars in the  mismatch  condition may be considered as 
out of category to the cue. Numerically, the Bad Match exemplars elicit N400 amplitudes that 
are in between those of Good Match and Good Mismatch, reminiscent of the pattern of effects 
for related but less expected words like “honey.”  However, the differences between Bad Match, 
Bad Mismatch and Good Mismatch are not significant and hence it is unclear whether the 
intermediate N400 amplitudes for exemplars related to the cue but not an exact match replicate 
across words and pictures.  We also note that data on semantic attributes of natural scenes is 
currently lacking and so it is unclear how related the Bad scenes are to the Good scenes. Data  
	 69	
will need to be collected in the future to make a more robust model of semantic neighborhoods 
for multiple categories of natural scenes that will help probe the gradient of the N400 amplitude 
as related to expected and unexpected natural scenes.  
 
Given the above interpretations of the N300 and the N400, one additional inference that we can 
make from our data and prior work is that the N300 and N400 index different things. Previous 
work on the N300, suggests it indexes perceptual regularities in the stimulus (Vo and Wolfe, 
2013; Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 2007; McPherson & Holcomb, 1999; Pietrowsky et al., 
1996), whereas the N400 indexes meaning in the stimulus (Sitnikova, Holcomb, Kiyonaga, & 
Kuperberg, 2008). Here, in the N300 time-window, the N300 amplitudes for bad exemplars, 
either in the matched or mismatched condition, are overall more negative than those for the good 
exemplars (Figure 4.2 and difference waves in Figure 4.3). This pattern implies that N300 
amplitude, despite miscuing, trends towards indexing perceptual regularities (see also Mcpherson 
& Holcomb, 1999); that is, the N300 shows a facilitation to good exemplars (lower N300 
amplitude) even in the mismatch condition, indicating that it indexes representativeness to a well 
learned category, even when the stimulus does not fit the current semantic context. If the N300 
amplitude indexed meaning, the amplitude would have been much larger for the good 
mismatched exemplars as they do not fit the semantic context of the cue. In contrast, in the 
N400, the good exemplars in the match condition, have the least negative amplitude and the 
remaining conditions (good mismatch, bad mismatch and bad match) have larger N400 
amplitudes. This pattern indicates that the N400 clearly indexes the processing of the meaning of 
the stimulus in the context of the verbal cue, rather than the perceptual form. The good 
exemplars in the match and mismatch case are equally representative of their category in the two 
	 70	
cases. If the N400 indexed representativeness, the amplitude of the N400 would have been 
similar in the match and mismatch conditions. The difference in the match and mismatch 
conditions is the meaning of the good exemplar with respect to the semantic context provided by 
the cue. In the mismatch condition, the meaning of the good exemplar is completely out of 
context to wth respect to the semantics of the verbal cue while in the match condition it fits the 
semantic context. The differences between the N300 and N400 are also seen in the scalp 
distributions of the effects, with the N300 being frontal and the N400 for natural scenes being 
centro-parietal with a slight left laterality. 
 
In conclusion, we have shown that semantics, via a verbal precue, can modulate the processing 
of good and bad exemplars of natural scenes in the later stages of perceptual processing, in a 
250-350 ms time-window. This modulation occurs despite the written word having no perceptual 
resemblance to the stimulus. It is the meaning, or semantics, of the word that is modulating 
visual processing as the N300 time-window is considered a perceptual selection, matching or 
pruning stage. This, we believe, is strong evidence for the influence of semantics on visual 
processing on natural scenes. 
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4.5 Figures  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Schematic of one trial in the experiment. At the start of each trial a word cue (e.g. 
"Beach") from one of six categories (beaches, city streets, forests, highways, mountains, and 
offices) is shown. This is followed by a screen with a fixation cross is shown for time-period 
randomized between 1000-2000 ms. A good or bad exemplar image from one of the six 
categories is presented at one of the following locations: the center, the right visual field or the 
left visual field, followed by a fixation cross. The subjects then make a delayed response, with a 
button press, to the question "Yes or No?" (“Yes” if the image matches the cue and “No” 
otherwise) and the next trial begins. On 25% of the trials, there is a mismatch between the word 
cue and the image category. 
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Figure 4.2 A (contd.): The grand average ERP waveforms for the good-match (solid-blue), bad-
match (solid-maroon), good-mismatch (dotted-blue), bad-mismatch (dotted-maroon) conditions 
shown at 8 electrode sites. The channel locations are marked in yellow on the schematic of the 
scalp. The good/bad waveforms for the match conditions differ in the N300 time-window (250-
350 ms), with greater negativity for bad exemplars as compared to good exemplars, over frontal 
sites. In the mismatch condition, the differences between good and bad exemplars in the N300 
time-window are reduced. We also see a distinct pattern in the N400 time-window with the 
matched good exemplars facilitated in processing while the matched bad exemplars and the 
mismatched good and bad exemplars showing greater negativity than the matched good 
exemplar. B: The mean of the ERP amplitude over 11 frontal electrode sites (N = 20). The 
plotted error bars are within-subject confidence intervals. This shows that the difference between 
good and bad exemplars in the N300 time-window replicates results from the previous 
experiment (Figure 3.2) in the match condition. There is no evidence for differences between 
good and bad exemplars in the mismatch case (Bayes factor = 0.32). 
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Figure 4.3: The mean of the N400 ERP amplitude over 11 frontal electrode sites (N = 20). The 
plotted error bars are within-subject confidence intervals. There is a significant difference 
between good exemplars in the match and mismatch condition, with the greatest negativity for 
the good mismatched exemplars. The bad exemplars show an intermediate N400 amplitude, 
between the good match and the good mismatch amplitudes. 
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Figure 4.4: Topographic plots of the difference waves for the two main effects of 
representativeness (Bad – Good ) and cueing (Mismatch –Match). In the N300 time-window the 
two main effects are qualitatively similar, with both main effects showing a frontal distribution. 
The N300 time-window also shows a quantitatively larger effect for the representativeness (Bad 
– Good) than for the cueing (Mismatch – Match). In the N400 time-window, both effects are 
centro-parietally distributed with a  slight left laterality. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
One of the long-standing questions in cognitive science is: Does the semantics of a stimulus in 
one modality (vision, hearing, taste, touch and smell) influence the perception of the stimulus in 
another modality? In my thesis, I specifically focused on semantics as instantiated by language 
(written words) and sought to determine if this influenced the visual processing of natural scenes. 
There is no perceptual similarity between written words and pictures of natural scenes. Thus, any 
influence of reading the word on visual processing of images must necessarily be mediated by 
the meaning, or semantics, of the word and scene. I have thus used words to instantiate semantics 
and have shown that this instantiation is cross-modal and does influence visual processing. I 
summarize the results of this dissertation below. 
 
As a first step in showing that semantics may influence visual processing, I showed that there are 
multiple brain regions that show similar patterns of activity between pictures and words. This 
extends prior work that examined brain regions that showed an overlap of areas that are activated 
by pictures and words. Overlap only implies common brain regions across pictures and words, 
but indicates nothing about the underlying patterns of activity for each modality. Our results 
showing similar activity patterns across modalities imply that the underlying neural code is 
similar for pictures and words describing natural scenes. This is stronger evidence for the 
existence of a common representation across pictures and words. These regions that show similar 
representations across modalities have also been implicated in studies using words and objects, 
with some commonalities and differences. There are many common regions that we see in our 
studies and those in the other studies using simple objects. The angular gyrus, IPL, Precuneus 
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and lateral posterior temporal regions are common across studies, indicating a core semantic 
network. The differences that we see with our study as compared to other studies are in higher 
visual areas: we see many brain regions that are specific to scene processing such as the anterior 
PPA and the RSC, while other studies (Fairhall and Caramazza, 2013) using objects do not show 
these regions as sharing similar representations.  This implies that these regions show similar 
patterns of activation, across pictures and words, based on the type of stimulus (scenes as 
opposed to objects). We can thus speculate that these regions preferentially process stimuli (e.g. 
PPA for natural scenes) and hence are perceptual regions that are activated by words that trigger 
the semantics relevant to these regions (e.g. words evoking scenes for the anterior PPA). So, in 
addition to a core semantic network, we have a distributed set of regions in higher visual areas 
that show similar patterns of activity across pictures and words and also show preference to the 
type of stimulus. It is these brain regions that plausibly could act as processing sites where 
semantics and visual processing interact. 
 
To examine if there could be a dynamic interaction between semantics and visual processing, we 
used representativeness of a scene as a proxy for prior knowledge. The properties that make a 
scene representative (good) for a category have been well learnt over time. Although prior work 
showed that representativeness mattered in categorization and detection tasks (Caddigan et al., 
2010; 2017), the information was lacking on whether this was due to low-level visual features 
(e.g. color, contrast, luminance), high-level visual features (e.g. spatial structure) or due to the 
semantic information pertaining to the representativeness of the scene. Using ERPs we 
determined that the brain is sensitive to representativeness of scenes in a time-window (250-350 
ms) indexed by the N300 component. This time-window is later than the time scale for low-level 
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visual processing and consistent with higher level visual processing, at the perceptual selection 
and matching stage for global visual properties (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; 2003; 2007). Good 
scenes are facilitated in processing as compared to bad scenes (Chapter 3). In comparison to 
prior work with objects, we can infer that a match to a template has been made at this stage for 
good and bad exemplars in the N300 time-window. Based on our own results and prior work on 
the N300 (Schendan and Kutas, 2002), we linked the N300 to a stage of processing that is 
sensitive to learned statistical regularities, encompassing global structure (Schendan and Kutas, 
2002), canonical viewpoints (Schendan and Kutas, 2003), probableness (Vo and Wolfe, 2013), 
and representativeness of scenes (in this work, Chapters 3 and 4). We argue that good exemplars 
are facilitated because they match statistical regularities (or templates) that we have learned over 
time. This result still does not tell us if these templates, that come from our prior knowledge, can 
interact with visual processing. Also, we do not know if these templates are instantiated only by 
perceptual stimuli or if can they be activated cross-modally, for example by words. 
 
To better understand the dynamics with which semantic information might influence visual 
processing, we used words to try to pre-activate  templates. The words provided cues to the 
category of the incoming stimulus. When the incoming stimuli matched expectations, there were 
differences in the ERP waveform between good and bad exemplars in the N300 time-window 
(250-350 ms). When there was a mismatch between expectation and the incoming stimuli, there 
was no significant difference in the ERP waveform between the good and bad exemplars in the 
N300 time-window. From these results, we inferred that the word cues help instantiate category 
templates and that good exemplars were facilitated in processing because they better matched the 
templates for their categories. Under conditions of mismatch, when good  scenes, which are 
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representative of a different category than the cue, are processed, they do not match the active 
templates instantiated by the cue. This results in even these good scenes being processed as bad 
scenes due to the mismatch with the current template.  The mechanism of instantiating category 
templates via written words is necessarily mediated through semantics, as the written words have 
no perceptual similarity to the images. Thus, semantic information via words has dynamically 
influenced visual processing of natural scene images. 
 
The dynamics of the interaction of semantics with visual processing, differ is some aspects 
between when there is a word pre-cue as compared to when there is no pre-cue during trials. 
Although in both cases the stimulus is matched to learned regularities, there are differences in the 
activation of these regularities. When each trial begins with a verbal cue, participants can pre-
activate templates, before the stimulus is shown. The visual processing that follows interacts 
with this pre-activated template. When there is no verbal cue at the beginning of the trial, the 
stimulus is still matched to known learned regularities, but how are these regularities activated? 
One possible mechanism is via the extraction of scene gist. Humans are very efficient at 
extracting the gist of scenes (Walther et al., 2009), even in low resolution conditions when 
individual objects in the scene cannot be identified (Oliva and Schyns, 1995). This gist extraction 
occurs in a time-window after about 150 ms (Thorpe et al., 1996). Once the gist is extracted, a 
template corresponding to the gist can be activated and the incoming stimulus can be matched to 
this template, which we argue occurs in the N300 time-window. Thus, in the two experiments, 
one with a pre-cue and one without a pre-cue, the incoming stimulus can be matched to activated 
templates and dynamically processed. 
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One additional factor that we must consider from these experiments is the differing 
methodologies used: fMRI and ERP. While fMRI has high spatial resolution and low temporal 
resolution, ERPs have high temporal resolution and low spatial resolution. The results from the 
fMRI thus show us information at long time scales. Hence, the spatial regions that we see in our  
fMRI study include processing at long time-scales, i.e. both feedback and recurrent processing. 
The ERP results give us information at fast time-scales of processing. Given that we see the 
interaction of semantics and visual processing from the ERP waveforms in the N300 time-
window, and the fMRI results indicated cross-decoding in higher visual areas, we believe that the 
higher visual areas are a plausible site for the interaction of semantics and visual processing. 
Other studies (Hasson et al., 2015) have implicated high-level visual processing regions as 
processing information at longer time-scales and have also implicated them in cross-modal 
processing (Chen et al., 2016). 
 
We have thus provided evidence for the dynamic influence of semantics on visual processing of 
natural scenes and also showed brain regions that represent information similarly across pictures 
and words. Semantic cueing, via words, can set up expectancy and modulate the processing of 
incoming pictures. This interactive processing can occur in brain regions processing semantics 
linked to different visual processing regions or it can occur in local regions, where we showed 
that words and pictures had similar patterns of representation. Indeed, the distinction between 
semantic information and visual information may well be artificial in some brain regions, as their 
representations can be interchanged. More work would be needed to delineate the nature of 
processing in regions that show similar patterns of activity across pictures and words. There is no 
doubt though, that in some situations, semantics does influence visual processing.	  
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Appendix A 
 List of Phrases Describing Natural Scenes 
List of phrases used as word stimuli. Each box contains the 4-phrase sets that appeared in a 
block. The sequence of phrases within a block and the block order were randomized across 
subjects. 
 
Beaches 
Beaches (contd.) 
    
1 APPEALING BEACH 33 PEACEFUL BEACH 
2 BEAUTIFUL SEASIDE 34 LOVELY SEASHORE 
3 WINDY SEASHORE 35 SERENE BEACH 
4 QUIET BEACH 36 PICTURESQUE SEASIDE 
5 BEAUTIFUL SEASHORE 37 SUNNY SEASHORE 
6 SUNNY SEASIDE 38 PLEASANT BEACH 
7 BREEZY BEACH 39 RADIANT SEASIDE 
8 GOLDEN SEASHORE 40 PLEASING SEASIDE 
9 BREATHTAKING SEASIDE 41 TROPICAL SEASHORE 
10 VAST SEASIDE 42 RESPLENDENT SEASIDE 
11 BRIGHT SEASHORE 43 SANDY BEACH 
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Beaches (contd.) 
    
12 SUNNY BEACH 44 REFRESHING SEASHORE 
13 CLOUDY SEASIDE 45 TROPICAL SEASIDE 
14 SCENIC BEACH 46 RELAXING BEACH 
15 BREEZY SEASHORE 47 PRETTY SEASHORE 
16 DELIGHTFUL SEASIDE 48 ROMANTIC BEACH 
17 DESOLATE BEACH 49 SANDY SEASIDE 
18 ENTICING SEASHORE 50 SCENIC SEASHORE 
19 WINDY BEACH 51 SERENE SEASHORE 
20 GRAND SEASIDE 52 SOOTHING BEACH 
21 HEAVENLY SEASHORE 53 SUBLIME SEASHORE 
22 HOT BEACH 54 BLISSFUL SEASHORE 
23 ENTICING BEACH 55 TRANQUIL SEASIDE 
24 HUMID SEASIDE 56 VAST BEACH 
25 PICTURESQUE SEASHORE 57 PICTURESQUE BEACH 
26 BREEZY SEASIDE 58 LOVELY SEASIDE 
27 LOVELY BEACH 59 WINDY SEASIDE 
28 WARM SEASIDE 60 WONDERFUL SEASHORE 
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Beaches (contd.) 
    
29 LUSH BEACH 61 SERENE SEASIDE 
30 TROPICAL BEACH 62 ENTICING SEASIDE 
31 SCENIC SEASIDE 62 BEAUTIFUL BEACH 
32 VAST SEASHORE 64 SANDY SEASHORE 
 
 
Cities 
Cities (contd.)     
1 GREEN CITY 33 HARMONIOUS DOWNTOWN 
2 HISTORIC CITY 34 EXPENSIVE TOWN 
3 BIG DOWNTOWN 35 HUGE TOWN 
4 UNIFORM TOWN 36 INDUSTRIOUS CITY 
5 BRIGHT DOWNTOWN 37 HARMONIOUS TOWN 
6 BUSY TOWN 38 LIVELY TOWN 
7 CENTRAL CITY 39 HECTIC CITY 
8 PROSPEROUS DOWNTOWN 40 GLAMOROUS DOWNTOWN 
9 CHAOTIC DOWNTOWN 41 EXPENSIVE CITY 
10 CHARMING TOWN 42 LIVELY DOWNTOWN 
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Cities (contd.)     
11 CLEAN CITY 43 LOUD TOWN 
12 PACKED TOWN 44 MODERN DOWNTOWN 
13 WEALTHY CITY 45 NOISY CITY 
14 CROWDED CITY 46 ORGANIZED DOWNTOWN 
15 VIBRANT TOWN 47 GLAMOROUS TOWN 
16 ELECTRIC DOWNTOWN 48 PACKED CITY 
17 DYNAMIC TOWN 49 EXCITING TOWN 
18 POPULOUS CITY 50 QUAINT TOWN 
19 EXCITING DOWNTOWN 51 RESTLESS DOWNTOWN 
20 WEALTHY TOWN 52 TALL CITY 
21 ENCHANTING DOWNTOWN 53 ENCHANTING TOWN 
22 CROWDED DOWNTOWN 54 PROSPEROUS CITY 
23 ENERGETIC CITY 55 CHARMING CITY 
24 ENTICING TOWN 56 WEALTHY DOWNTOWN 
25 PACKED DOWNTOWN 57 LIVELY CITY 
26 ENCHANTING CITY 58 PROSPEROUS TOWN 
27 EXCITING CITY 59 SPARKLING DOWNTOWN 
28 FANCY TOWN 60 CROWDED TOWN 
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Cities (contd.)     
29 EXPENSIVE DOWNTOWN 61 HARMONIOUS CITY 
30 GLAMOROUS CITY 62 VIBRANT CITY 
31 VIBRANT DOWNTOWN 62 CHARMING DOWNTOWN 
32 GRAND TOWN 64 CONCRETE TOWN 
 
 
Highways 
Highways (contd.)     
1 ARTERIAL HIGHWAY 33 MONOTONOUS FREEWAY 
2 BEAUTIFUL FREEWAY 34 CONCRETE INTERSTATE 
3 BORING HIGHWAY 35 MUNDANE INTERSTATE 
4 FAST INTERSTATE 36 NECESSARY HIGHWAY 
5 BROAD HIGHWAY 37 WIDE INTERSTATE 
6 MONOTONOUS INTERSTATE 38 NOISY FREEWAY 
7 COMPLEX FREEWAY 39 CONGESTED INTERSTATE 
8 CONCRETE HIGHWAY 40 MODERN HIGHWAY 
9 WINDING FREEWAY 41 OPEN INTERSTATE 
10 CONGESTED FREEWAY 42 ORGANIZED HIGHWAY 
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Highways (contd.)     
11 SMOOTH HIGHWAY 43 PACKED FREEWAY 
12 CROWDED INTERSTATE 44 CONCRETE FREEWAY 
13 NOISY INTERSTATE 45 SMOOTH INTERSTATE 
14 DIRTY HIGHWAY 46 WINDING HIGHWAY 
15 DRAB FREEWAY 47 EMPTY FREEWAY 
16 DREARY INTERSTATE 48 PACKED HIGHWAY 
17 EFFICIENT HIGHWAY 49 PERVASIVE FREEWAY 
18 EMPTY INTERSTATE 50 PLEASURABLE HIGHWAY 
19 PANORAMIC INTERSTATE 51 ROUGH INTERSTATE 
20 BROAD FREEWAY 52 SLEEK FREEWAY 
21 CONGESTED HIGHWAY 53 BROAD INTERSTATE 
22 FAST HIGHWAY 54 SMOOTH FREEWAY 
23 FLOWING FREEWAY 55 MONOTONOUS HIGHWAY 
24 ARTERIAL INTERSTATE 56 SPEEDY HIGHWAY 
25 EMPTY HIGHWAY 57 STANDARD FREEWAY 
26 FUNCTIONAL FREEWAY 58 FAST FREEWAY 
27 PACKED INTERSTATE 59 TEDIOUS INTERSTATE 
28 INTRUSIVE FREEWAY 60 NOISY HIGHWAY 
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Highways (contd.)     
29 LINEAR HIGHWAY 61 URBAN HIGHWAY 
30 LONELY INTERSTATE 62 WIDE FREEWAY 
31 CLEAN FREEWAY 62 ARTERIAL FREEWAY 
32 WIDE HIGHWAY 64 WINDING INTERSTATE 
 
Mountains 
Mountains (contd.)     
1 ALPINE PEAK 33 TOWERING PEAK 
2 BREATHTAKING PEAK 34 ICY MOUNTAIN 
3 CHALLENGING SUMMIT 35 LUSH SUMMIT 
4 CHILLY MOUNTAIN 36 MAJESTIC PEAK 
5 WONDROUS MOUNTAIN 37 LARGE MOUNTAIN 
6 MAJESTIC SUMMIT 38 PHENOMENAL PEAK 
7 CLOUDY PEAK 39 GLORIOUS SUMMIT 
8 COLD SUMMIT 40 RELAXING MOUNTAIN 
9 COLOSSAL PEAK 41 REFRESHING MOUNTAIN 
10 DANGEROUS PEAK 42 SCENIC MOUNTAIN 
11 WILD SUMMIT 43 ROCKY SUMMIT 
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Mountains (contd.)     
12 FROSTY MOUNTAIN 44 STAGGERING PEAK 
13 LUSH PEAK 45 ROLLING MOUNTAIN 
14 DANGEROUS SUMMIT 46 ROUGH PEAK 
15 GIGANTIC MOUNTAIN 47 PICTURESQUE SUMMIT 
16 ENORMOUS MOUNTAIN 48 SENSATIONAL PEAK 
17 GIGANTIC SUMMIT 49 SERENE SUMMIT 
18 TOWERING SUMMIT 50 LUSH MOUNTAIN 
19 STEEP PEAK 51 MONUMENTAL PEAK 
20 HUGE MOUNTAIN 52 HUGE SUMMIT 
21 GIGANTIC PEAK 53 STAGGERING SUMMIT 
22 HIGH SUMMIT 54 TREMENDOUS MOUNTAIN 
23 STAGGERING MOUNTAIN 55 STEEP MOUNTAIN 
24 ICY PEAK 56 IMMENSE PEAK 
25 STEEP SUMMIT 57 STUPENDOUS PEAK 
26 MAJESTIC MOUNTAIN 58 DANGEROUS MOUNTAIN 
27 GLORIOUS PEAK 59 TRANQUIL SUMMIT 
28 IMMENSE SUMMIT 60 TOWERING MOUNTAIN 
29 GLORIOUS MOUNTAIN 61 HUGE PEAK 
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Mountains (contd.)     
30 SNOWY PEAK 62 ICY SUMMIT 
31 IMMENSE MOUNTAIN 62 VAST MOUNTAIN 
32 CHILLY SUMMIT 64 CHILLY PEAK 
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Appendix B 
Cross-Decoding Map: 400 Voxel Cluster 
 
Figure B.1. Cross-decoding intersection maps created based on the permutation test cluster size 
of 400 clusters. A minimum threshold of 27% was determined to be significant (p< 0.05) for a 
400 voxel cluster. We see a few more regions in the ventral-temporal areas as compared to using 
a cluster size of 100 voxels and a minimum threshold of 27.75% (Figure 2). 
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Appendix C 
 Confusion Matrices and BOLD measurements for ROIs 
For the following analyses we limit our selves to clusters of 100 voxels or more in order to 
ensure reliable MVPA. Specifically, to ascertain whether results were being driven by a single 
category, we created ROIs from our cross-decoding maps (Table 2.1), with the largest cluster 
(Precuneus, Angular Gyrus and RSC) being split into 3 subclusters (see below), bringing us to a 
total of 7 clusters. We computed confusion matrices for the each of these clusters for each of the 
two cross-decoding conditions (train on pictures, test on words; train on words, test on pictures). 
This was done for each subject and the mean of these confusion matrices, averaged across the 
two decoding conditions, are displayed in Appendix C. The column values are ground truth 
labels and the row values are predictions of the classifier. We used the Kruskal-Wallis test to 
look for accuracy differences in cross-decoding across our four categories (diagonal elements of 
the matrix).  
 
We also calculated the mean and standard deviation of the normalized signal (i.e. percent signal 
change) for each scene category and each of the ROIs that we created to compute the confusion 
matrix (Appendix C). We note that these values are smaller than the beta weights used in 
univariate analyses because the normalized data are centered around zero.  We include them only 
as an indication that there is no consistent mean differences among categories, underscoring the 
need for MVPA.  
 
As noted above, our largest cluster encompasses a broad set of regions covering the Precuneus, 
the Angular gyrus, and the RSC. Because these presumably reflect different functional areas. in 
computing the confusion matrices we split this ROI into a smaller subset of regions. We 
	 102	
accomplished this by raising the statistical threshold (28.98%) on the cross-decoding accuracy 
map until three separate clusters emerged for the Precuneus, the Angular Gyrus and the RSC. We 
report the confusion matrices and the mean of the BOLD signal values for the subclusters below. 
 
Confusion Matrix: Subcluster l-Precuneus (526 voxels; MNI :-28, -70, 46) 
 
Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Beaches 27.43 23.87 22.05 26.65 
Cities 25.18 30.04 17.97 26.82 
Highways 27.44 19.80 28.56 24.22 
Mountains 24.22 21.27 19.44 35.07 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 3.15, df = 3, p = 0.3686. 
Confusion Matrix: Subcluster r-Angular Gyrus (239 voxels; MNI: 38, -72, 40) 
 
Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Beaches 29.26 20.31 22.92 27.52 
Cities 25.26 27.00 23.35 24.40 
Highways 24.83 17.97 33.08 24.13 
Mountains 25.61 17.71 20.49 36.20 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 3.11, df = 3, p = 0.3746. 
 
Confusion Matrix: Subcluster r-RSC (102 voxels; MNI: 14, -56, 18) 
 
Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Beaches 29.34 19.88 21.97 28.82 
Cities 25.43 26.22 21.44 26.91 
Highways 24.57 24.14 24.48 26.83 
Mountains 24.57 18.40 20.31 36.72 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 6, df = 3, p = 0.1116. 
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Confusion Matrix: r-Middle Frontal Gyrus Cluster 1 (458 voxels) 
 
Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Beaches 28.30 24.91 21.18 25.61 
Cities 24.14 28.21 22.22 25.44 
Highways 25.09 19.71 30.73 24.48 
Mountains 24.22 21.10 18.84 35.85 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 4.61, df = 3, p = 0.2029. 
 
Confusion Matrix: r-Middle Frontal Gyrus Cluster 2 (172 voxels). 
 
Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Beaches 28.74 21.62 25.26 24.39 
Cities 24.40 26.56 25.96 23.09 
Highways 21.35 22.83 30.64 25.17 
Mountains 25.26 22.40 22.57 29.78 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.34, df = 3, p = 0.7186. 
 
Confusion Matrix: l-Middle Frontal Gyrus Cluster 1 (124 voxels) 
 
Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Beaches 24.83 25.87 28.13 21.18 
Cities 22.66 25.79 29.34 22.23 
Highways 23.44 24.83 32.81 18.93 
Mountains 24.13 23.79 25.61 26.48 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 6.16, df = 3, p = 0.1043. 
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Confusion Matrix. l-Inferior Frontal Gyrus Cluster 1  
 
Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Beaches 25.35 26.31 27.61 20.75 
Cities 23.18 27.87 30.38 18.58 
Highways 22.49 26.83 31.16 19.53 
Mountains 22.23 23.70 27.87 26.22 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.95, df = 3, p = 0.3995. 
 
The mean values of the BOLD signal for words and pictures, along with the standard deviation 
(stdev) for the Subcluster l-Precuneus. 
 Words Pictures 
 Beaches Cities Highways Mountains Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Mean 1.02E-01 7.90E-02 6.10E-02 7.94E-02 1.09E-01 1.09E-01 1.52E-01 1.04E-01 
stdev 1.19E-01 8.49E-02 1.38E-01 1.12E-01 1.39E-01 9.61E-02 1.63E-01 1.12E-01 
 
The mean values of the BOLD signal for words and pictures, along with the standard deviation 
(stdev) for the Subcluster r-Angular Gyrus. 
 Words Pictures 
 Beaches Cities Highways Mountains Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Mean 1.52E-02 3.70E-05 -3.01E-02 -5.39E-02 2.68E-02 5.51E-02 7.24E-02 -6.09E-02 
stdev 7.53E-02 1.17E-01 8.31E-02 1.20E-01 1.02E-01 1.22E-01 2.01E-01 1.04E-01 
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The mean values of the BOLD signal for words and pictures, along with the standard deviation 
(stdev) for the Subcluster r-RSC. 
 Words Pictures 
 Beaches Cities Highways Mountains Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Mean 1.52E-02 3.70E-05 -3.01E-02 -5.39E-02 2.68E-02 5.51E-02 7.24E-02 -6.09E-02 
stdev 7.53E-02 1.17E-01 8.31E-02 1.20E-01 1.02E-01 1.22E-01 2.01E-01 1.04E-01 
 
 
The mean values of the BOLD signal for words and pictures, along with the standard deviation 
(stdev) for r-Middle Frontal Gyrus Cluster 1. 
 
Words 
Pictures 
 Beaches Cities Highways Mountains Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Mean 1.39E-02 -2.08E-02 -1.59E-02 -1.07E-02 3.04E-02 4.18E-02 6.12E-02 -4.05E-02 
stdev  8.97E-02 7.57E-02 1.02E-01 7.66E-02 8.12E-02 1.10E-01 1.83E-01 7.31E-02 
 
 
The mean values of the BOLD signal for words and pictures, along with the standard deviation 
(stdev) r-Middle Frontal Gyrus Cluster 2. 
 Words Pictures 
 Beaches Cities Highways Mountains Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Mean -6.23E-02 -3.88E-02 -9.77E-02 -8.54E-02 -2.92E-02 -3.23E-02 -1.06E-01 -7.01E-02 
stdev  6.91E-02 7.34E-02 1.08E-01 1.03E-01 7.91E-02 1.21E-01 9.46E-02 7.64E-02 
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The mean values of the BOLD signal for words and pictures, along with the standard deviation 
(stdev) for  l-Middle Frontal Gyrus Cluster 1. 
 Words Pictures 
 Beaches Cities Highways Mountains Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Mean 1.34E-02 4.04E-02 2.92E-02 -3.38E-02 -3.52E-02 3.42E-02 -1.14E-01 -5.66E-02 
stdev  1.41E-01 9.01E-02 1.39E-01 6.99E-02 1.05E-01 1.35E-01 1.74E-01 1.56E-01 
 
 
The mean values of the BOLD signal for words and pictures, along with the standard deviation 
(stdev) for l-Middle Frontal Gyrus Cluster 2. 
 Words Pictures 
 Beaches Cities Highways Mountains Beaches Cities Highways Mountains 
Mean 1.13E-01 7.80E-02 1.32E-01 1.39E-01 3.46E-02 1.13E-01 1.83E-02 7.73E-02 
stdev  1.73E-01 1.81E-01 2.35E-01 1.60E-01 7.90E-02 1.20E-01 1.94E-01 1.37E-01 
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Appendix D 
Cross-Decoding Maps In Each Direction 
 
The cross-decoding maps showing both directions of cross-decoding (train on pictures, test on 
words and train on words, test on pictures) are presented below. 
 
Figure D.1 A: Cross-decoding accuracy from pictures to words (train on picture runs and test on 
a word run). B: Cross-decoding accuracy from words to pictures (train on word runs and test on a 
picture run). C: A map of the intersection of the two cross-decoding results: only pictures to 
words (blue), only words to pictures (orange) and regions common to both sets (red). 
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Figure D.1. (contd.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 109	
 
Figure D.1 (contd.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
